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M. Ulric Killion t
ABSTRACT
The issue presented is whether Chinese regionalism (quyu
zhuyi), or "new regionalism" (xin quyu zhuyi), poses a threat to the
multilateral world trading system. The question directly relates to
the recent 2004 ASEAN-China accord, which proposes to
establish the world's largest free trade area (FTA). Regionalism
promoted by exclusionary motivations, such as political
considerations, tends to produce trade distortion, and is welfare-
reducing. An exclusionary trading area of such magnitude may
pose a threat to multilateral world trade. In such an event, trade
distortion may result in great harm to the global economy,
producing disastrous economic and social consequences
worldwide. This article examines the consequences that may flow
from the recent 2004 ASEAN-China accord and adequacy of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules governing FTAs. It also
analyzes Chinese regionalism, trade distortion versus trade
creation, and finally, whether the 2004 ASEAN-China accord
threatens the WTO and multilateral trade, especially in the wake
of the January 1, 2005, termination of the WTO Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC).
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I. Introduction
The emergence of the People's Republic of China (China) as a
major economic and political power presents a significant
challenge to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations'
(ASEAN) regionalism and to the multilateral world trading
system.1 Having joined the World Trade Organization (WTO),
China now appears determined, for political reasons, to use free
trade agreements (FTAs) to consolidate an Asian regional trading
system.2 On November 29, 2004, China joined ASEAN in an
agreement that established regional cooperation between the
signing countries.3 This agreement paved the way for establishing
the world's largest free trade zone, composed of 1.7 billion
consumers, and demonstrated a Chinese model for regionalism
(quyu zhuyi), if not a "new regionalism" (xin quyu zhuyi).4
Regionalism based on the European Union model, or regional
agreements comprising developed economies and developing
economies, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), are successful models of integration.5  In these
1 See China More Mature in Diplomacy, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 16, 2004; see also
ASEAN.org, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Overview,
http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm [hereinafter ASEAN] ("ASEAN was established on 8
August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January
1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on
30 April 1999.").
2 See Naoko Munakata, The Impact of the Rise of China and Regional Economic
Integration in Asia-A Japanese Perspective, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission Hearing on China's Growth as a Regional Economic Power, Dec. 4, 2003,
Washington, D.C., http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2003hearings/written-testimonies/
031204bios/naokmunakata.htm; see also Decision, Accession of the People's Republic of
China, W/1432 (Nov. 10, 2001). The Protocol was accepted by the Government of the
People's Republic of China on Nov. 11, 2001, and will come into force on December 11,
2001. Pursuant to paragraph 1, Part 1 of the Protocol, China will become a member of
the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2001. Accession of the People's
Republic of China, supra.
3 See Deal Forms Free-trade Megazone, China, ASEAN Sign Landmark Accord,
SHANGHAI DAILY, Nov. 30, 2004 [hereinafter Deal Forms Free-trade Megazone].
4 Id.
5 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Regional Integration Agreement, OECD Publication, Jan. 1, 2001,
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instances, the economic benefits of integration far outweighed the
incidental economic costs of any secondary political
considerations that may have motivated integration.6 Conversely,
China now proposes a model of regional integration that is
primarily motivated by political considerations and threatens
multilateral trade.7
Following accession to the WTO, or more accurately, an
agreement on terms of accession with the United States in 1999,
China decided to use FTAs as a policy tool.8 This policy directed
its focus on making ASEAN China's first FTA partner.9 In
November 2000 during the fourth ASEAN Informal Summit,
China proposed the creation of an FTA between China and
ASEAN.' 0 In October 2001, China and ASEAN completed a
feasibility study for an FTA." One month later, it was determined
that an ASEAN-China FTA would be established within ten
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/192343l.pdf. "The most successful regional
integration to date has been the EU." Political objectives did in part motivate the
formation of the EU. Id. at 11. "However, the political effects can sometimes be
unexpected or opposite of the aspirations, as when regional preferences create such
unfair redistributions that they provoke conflict." Id. at 28.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments
and Strategic Motivations 13 (Inst. of Se. Asian Studies, Working Paper: International
Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1, 2003), http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsil2003.pdf
("Apparently China is employing this regional integration or regionalism to dilute U.S.
strategic unilateralism in East Asia."); Richard Baldwin, Problems and Prospects for East
Asian Regionalism: A Comparison with Europe, Speech at Research Institute of
Economics and Trade Brown Bag Lunch Seminar No. 163 (Jan. 31, 2003),
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/03013101.htm ("The lesson for Asia today is that
you cannot have two FTA blocs near each other. Once regional integration starts, it is
hard to resist. As an analogy, Japan's position is like the UK's position in Europe in the
1950s: it is the biggest market but a reluctant regionalist. China is like France was
because China is triggering integration for political reasons.").
8 China was primarily motivated by politics rather than economics. Naoko, supra
note 2.
9 Id.
10 John Wong & Sarah Chan, China-ASEAN Free Trade Arrangement:
Opportunities and Challenges, proceedings of the International Seminar on China-
ASEAN Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation (6-7 June 2002), organized
jointly by the Ministry of Foreign and Economic Cooperation, and Yunnan Provincial
People's Government, Kuoming, China, 217-235 (Sept. 2002), http://www.ecdc.net.cn/
newindex/chinese/page/sitemap/focus/proceedings/englishg/part%20two/O8.htm.
I1 Naoko, supra note 2.
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years. 12  The parties signed the Framework Agreement on
ASEAN-China Economic Cooperation in November 2002 to
establish an FTA by 2010 for older ASEAN members and by 2015
for newer ASEAN members.'3 ASEAN was chosen as China's
first FTA partner for the purpose of addressing perceived Chinese
threats to the economic and security interests of ASEAN nations.14
The overriding diplomatic and political considerations manifest
themselves in China's willingness, via an FTA, to allow ASEAN
economies to capitalize on its growth. 5 One such example is the
initial October 2003 elimination of tariffs on fruits and
vegetables. 16
An ASEAN-China FTA would comprise developing
economies, and the inclusion of such economies would provide a
WTO safety net for the parties. 7 In the event negotiations became
difficult, China and ASEAN could avail themselves of the
enabling clause for WTO developing members. 18 The enabling
clause permits "derogations to the most-favored nation (non-
discrimination) treatment in favor of developing countries. In
particular, its paragraph 2(c) permits preferential arrangements
among developing countries in goods trade."' 9 Thus, their FTA
would be exempt from the strict rule covering "substantially all the
trade," a rule governing an FTA with a developed country
member.2 °  The latter addresses a much-debated controversy
concerning a loophole in the WTO Rules: Article XXIV, which
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See T. N. Srinivasan, Preferential Trade Agreements with Special Reference to
Asia (Nov. 2001) (presented at the Asian Economic Outlook Workshop, Manila, Nov.
2001) (on file with Yale University), http://www.econ.yale.edu/-srinivas/Prefrrade
Agreements.pdf.
18 GATT 1947, Decision of 28 Nov. 1979 (LU4903) [hereinafter Enabling Clause],
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/enabling1979-e.htm.
19 Id.
20 Srinivasan, supra note 17; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[GATT], pt. III, art. XXIV: Territorial Application-Frontier Traffic-Customs Unions
and Free-trade Areas, paras. 5 and 8, http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/
gatt47.02_e.htm [hereinafter Free Trade Area Provision].
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governs FTAs.2'
China's pre-accession decision to employ FTAs as a policy
tool eventually culminated in the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord. 2
The accord, which is the world's largest proposed FTA, presents
the issue of whether there is a distinguishable Chinese model of
regionalism and what consequences may ensue from that model.
The potential consequences vary, from threatening trade and
investment liberalization, to enhancing possible worldwide
disastrous economic and social fallout resulting from the January
1, 2005, termination of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC).23
Part II of this Article presents an introduction to the 2004
ASEAN-China accord and its relevant terms and goals, followed
by an introduction to the consequences ensuing from the January
1, 2005 termination of the ATC. Then this Article introduces the
political economy environment of China, the WTO rules
governing FTAs, the goals of the WTO, and the problems
attendant to a growth of regional trading arrangements, such as
FTAs. It further explains the problem associated with FTAs
motivated by political rather than economic considerations in
terms of both trade creation versus trade diversion and welfare
enhancement versus welfare reduction.
Part III of the Article analyzes the 2004 ASEAN-China accord
in terms of FTAs motivated by political considerations versus
economic considerations, trade creation versus trade diversion, the
WTO rules governing FTAs, and the consequences, if any, that
21 Free Trade Area Provision, supra note 20, at para. 5; see also ARVIND
PANAGARIYA, REGIONALISM IN TRADE POLICY: ESSAYS ON PREFERENTIAL TRADING 47
(1999). Free Trade Areas (FTAs) can be grouped in three different WTO categories:
Article XXIV arrangements involving FTAs and Custom Unions (CUs), Enabling Clause
arrangements limited to developing countries and permitting partial preferences, and
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) arrangements permitted via a grant of an
exception to Article 1. PANAGARIYA supra.
22 Naoko, supra note 2 (In the FTA race, "China's moves are driven by a political
agenda of reassuring ASEAN and expanding its political influence in the region.").
23 See Press Brief, WTO, Textiles (1996), http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
iniste/min96_e/textiles.htm. The ATC replaced the Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA),
which was in force from 1974 to 1994. Id. See also VTO.org, Legal Texts: The WTO
Agreements, WTO Legal Texts: The Uruguay Round Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/ursume.htm#cAgreement [hereinafter
ATC].
2005]
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attach to the January 1, 2005 termination of the ATC. This Article
concludes with a discussion of the adequacy of WTO rules
governing FTAs, the growth of China-led regionalism, whether
Chinese regionalism presents a model of integration
distinguishable from Western models, and the consequences of
Chinese regionalism, which may include a threat to multilateral
trade and the WTO.
II. China and Regionalism
A. The 2004 ASEAN-CHINA Accord
At the Tenth ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos on
November 29, 2004, China and ASEAN signed a landmark
agreement to cut tariffs, which was a substantial step toward
creating the world's largest FTA by 2010.24 The most prominent
of the series of agreements and mechanisms produced by the
summit are the Agreement on Trade in Goods, the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between
ASEAN and China, and the Agreement on Dispute Settlement
Mechanism. 25 An important aspect of this accord is that it requires
the two regions to begin building a massive tariff-free market over
the next five years in an area comprising close to two billion
people.26
24 See Sun Shangwu, ASEAN Deal Hailed as Milestone for Regional Co-operation,
CHINA DAILY, Nov. 30, 2004.
25 See Sun Shangwu, ASEAN Links Push Free Trade, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 29, 2004.
26 Id. See also 10th ASEAN Summit.gov, ASEAN Overview (2004), paras. 10-11,
http:llwww. 1Othaseansummit.gov.la/aseanview.htm [hereinafter 10th ASEAN Summit].
10. In realising the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 98.62% of the products
in the CEPT Inclusion List (IL) of ASEAN-6 have been brought down to the 0-
5% tariff range. As of September 2004, products in the IL, which continue to
have tariffs of above 5% are those that have been transferred from the Sensitive
Lists (SL) and General Exception Lists (GE) in 2003. Tariffs on 60.89% of the
products in the IL of ASEAN-6 have been eliminated. The average tariff for
ASEAN-6 under the CEPT Scheme is now down to 1.91% from 12.76% in
1993. For the new ASEAN Member Countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam), 79.13% of the products traded in the region have been moved into the
IL and tariffs on 69.88% of these items have already been brought down within
the 0-5% band.
11. Regional financial cooperation has also strengthened. The bilateral swap
arrangements network under the Chiang Mai Initiative now comprises 16
agreements with a combined size of US$36.5 billion. The Finance Ministers of
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According to Chinese sources, the establishment of this FTA
will boost the development of this region, by 1.7 billion
consumers, about $1.8 trillion in gross domestic product (GDP),
and $1.2 trillion in trade volume.27 Statistics from the People's
Republic of China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) show that
ASEAN has been China's fifth largest trade partner for eleven
consecutive years. 28  Trade volume hit $84.61 billion in the first
ten months of 2004, which is an increase of 35.2 percent over the
same period in 2003.29 The accord between China and ASEAN is
expected to build on two-way trade and surpass $100 billion in
2004.30 Notwithstanding a trade deficit with ASEAN, China
anticipates that trade will balance out with growth in the region
and the agreements are expected to create a win-win situation for
economic and trade relations.3
Moreover, the significance of the 2004 ASEAN-China accord
is enhanced by China's increasingly growing global trade volume.
ASEAN are also working on a series of promotional activities to attract more
funds from developed capital markets outside Southeast Asia to move into
ASEAN to strengthen the regional financial markets. Id.
27 Sun, supra note 25.
28 Id. People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce (Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo shangwu bu) (MOFCOM), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/. The mandate of
the MOFCOM is "to formulate development strategies, guidelines and policies of
domestic and foreign trade and international economic cooperation," and other related
duties.
29 Sun, supra note 25.
30 Deal Forms Free-trade Megazone, supra note 3.
31 Id.; see also Sun, supra note 25; 10th ASEAN Summit, supra note 26, paras. 7-
9.
7. ASEAN's trade performance grew significantly in 2003. Total ASEAN
exports grew by 12.12% from US$383.85 billion in 2002 to US$430.39 billion
in 2003. Total ASEAN imports grew by 9.51% or from US$ 328.11 billion in
2002 to US$359.32 billion in 2003.
8. Intra-ASEAN exports grew higher than the total ASEAN exports. The
overall growth was 15.4% or in value term it grew from US$86.39 billion in
2002 to US$99.7 billion in 2003. Intra-ASEAN imports experienced modest
growth in 2003, from US$ 72.23 billion in 2002 to US$74.49 billion in 2003.
9. The United States, Japan, the European Union, China and the Republic of
Korea (ROK) remained ASEAN's largest trading partners. The share of
ASEAN's total trade with these countries in overall ASEAN trade in 2003 were
14.1%, 13.7%, 11.5%, 7.0% and 4.1%, respectively. 10th ASEAN Summit,
supra note 26, at paras. 7-9.
2005]
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In 2005, China's MOFCOM reported that in 2004 China registered
a 34.7 percent surge in foreign trade with $1.15 trillion being
exchanged.32 As a result, China became the world's third largest
trading power, behind only the United States and Germany.
33
However, some Chinese sources fear analysts may use these
figures to promote trade protectionism and insist China is not a
large or strong trading power.34 In defense of a large trade
volume, these sources tout a yearly surplus of $32 billion, which is
up by 25.5 percent year-on-year, and further argue that argue that
China's trade accounts for just 5.5 percent of global trade volume,
its per capita trade value is roughly only one-third of the world's
average, and in the first quarter of 2004 it registered a trade deficit
of $8.4 billion.35 Becoming the world's third largest trader by
volume may not necessarily be commensurate with being a strong
trading power. However, it is difficult to deny that the economic
data, especially trade volume, enhances the potential, and maybe
even the threatening aspects, of the 2004 ASEAN-China accord.
As for implementing the 2004 ASEAN-China accord, ASEAN
plans to accomplish this task by strengthening economic relations
and expanding trade through the establishment of FTAs and
Closer Economic Partnerships (CEPs).36 A Vientiane Action
Programme, which was adopted by the Tenth ASEAN Summit,
calls for the ten-member group to develop strategies for attracting
investment needed in order to sustain economic growth.37 In the
past decades, economic growth was largely driven by foreign
direct investment (FDI) and exports. 38 Exports have stabilized and
show signs of expanding. 39  However, since the East Asian
32 See Zhang Jin, Nation Now No. 3 Global Trader, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 12, 2005;
see also Zhi Ming, Large Trade Volume Itself Not a Reason for Being Content, CHINA
DAILY, Jan. 13, 2005.
33 Zhang, supra note 32.
34 Zhi, supra note 32.
35 Id.
36 Sun, supra note 24.
37 ASEAN, supra note 1.
38 Id.
39 Id. Despite the unfavorable external outlook and against the backdrop of
slowdown in global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, FDI flows to ASEAN
increased by 48%, up from $13.7 billion in 2002 to $20.2 billion in 2003, resulting in
ASEAN being one of the highest FDI growth regions. The overall improved ASEAN
[Vol. 3 1
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financial crisis (1997-98), ASEAN has experienced a sustained
decline in FDI.4° Therefore, the action program calls for a strategy
that will strengthen links and promote agreements with major
trade partners such as China, Japan, South Korea, the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, and India.4'
ASEAN members signed an agreement that will move them
closer to forming a European Union-style single market.42 They
also linked the pact for tariff-reduction to Bogor-type target
dates.43  ASEAN economic ministers called for tariffs to be
abolished by 2007 for the more developed members, such as
Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand.44 The other four members, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos,
and Vietnam, will have to abolish tariffs in sectors including autos,
textiles, and electronics by 2010.41 In addition, the Agreement on
Dispute Settlement Mechanism sets up a three-person panel of
independent experts to resolve trade disputes between ASEAN and
China.46
B. The Termination of the ATC
An additional problem for global trade is that the 2004
ASEAN-China Accord came at roughly the same time as the
conclusion of the WTO ATC on January 1, 2005. The ATC was
investment environment and strong regional economic growth and integration have
increased the attractiveness of ASEAN to foreign investors. The increase in FDI flows
in 2003 was the highest since 2000. 10th ASEAN Summit, supra note 26, para. 12.
40 ASEAN, supra note 1; see also 10th ASEAN Summit, supra note 26.
41 Sun, supra note 25.
42 Id.
43 See Shalendra D. Sharma, Beyond ASEAN and APEC: Towards a New Asia-
Pacific Economic Regionalism, E. AsIAN REv. (2002), at 37. While the APEC members
signed the 1994 Bogor Declaration, the accomplishment of the Bogor goals experienced
a serious setback because of the East Asian financial crisis. Id. See also Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Bogor, Indonesia, Nov. 15, 1994, APEC Economic
Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve, http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders-
declarations/i 994.htm.
44 Sun, supra note 24.
45 ASEAN Summit Stresses Integrated Region, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 30, 2004.
46 Sun, supra note 24; see also Deal Forms Free-trade Megazone, supra note 3.
47 China Apparel, Textiles Trade Reform: Unstitched by China, WTO, Oct. 22,
2004, http://www.efu.com/cn/eng/onlinesales/promotion/allround/2004-10-22/6605.htm.
20051
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widely acknowledged as trade-distorting with the distortions
having paradoxical effects. 8  The ATC protected developed
economy markets in that it used quotas to limit clothing imports
from developing economies. 49 The Uruguay Round international
trade negotiations in 1994 reached an agreement that would
dismantle the ATC in phases and would end when developed
economies removed all quota allocations on January 1, 2005.50
Developing and less-developed economies agreed because they
believed the removal of quota allocations would be beneficial.5'
Termination of the ATC is producing mixed results. 2 The
effect of removing this trade barrier will mostly accrue first in
China, then India.53 These two countries can produce clothing at
lower cost than any other developing economies because of the
prevalence of labor-intensive industries. 4  As a result, in
September 2004, nine developing and less-developed economies,
Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Sri Lanka, Uganda, Jamaica, and Nepal, requested the WTO's
Council for Trade in Goods to conduct country-specific analyses
to measure the effect of the ATC's termination. They sought
assistance for large scale restructuring to prevent predicted
impending disastrous economic and social consequences. These
nations, not unlike the rest of the world, have had difficulty
competing with China. 6 Comparatively, China's textile and
clothing imports experienced steady increases from 11 million
48 ATC, supra note 23. See also China Apparel, supra note 47.
49 China Apparel, supra note 47.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. See also Hildegunn Kyvik NordAs, The Global Textile and Clothing Industry
post the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 30 (WTO Secretariat, Discussion Paper
No. 5, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/res e/booksp-e/discussion-papers5e.pdf
(predicting, based upon a simulation of the impact of phrasing out ATC quotas, that for
clothing, "China and India combined take 65 percent of the export market--China triples
its market share while India's market share is quadrupled. All others lose market share
and the largest losses are incurred by African countries and Mexico, whose market
shares decline by close to 70 percent.").
54 China Apparel, supra note 47.
55 Id.
56 Id.
[Vol. 31
WTO AND LEGALIZED TRADE DISTORTION
units in 1995 to 213 million units in 2003."7 Estimates have
indicated the end of the ATC will result in job losses ranging from
about 27 million to 31 million worldwide.58
In June 2004, seventy-two textile and apparel groups from
thirty-six countries requested in the Istanbul Declaration that the
WTO extend the ATC quota-free deadline from December 31,
2004 to December 31, 2007, but their efforts failed.5 9 The new
FTA president, Ferry den Hoed, announced the death blow to the
Istanbul Declaration during a two-day mission to Geneva when the
FTA delegation he headed met with representatives from the
WTO, the International Labor Organization (ILO),60 and ministers
and ambassadors from the larger developing countries. "'The
Istanbul Declaration is dead,' stated Ferry den Hoed after his
discussions in Geneva. ' 61 The Istanbul Declaration was a failed
plea to their individual governments to undertake the following
actions: an emergency meeting of the WTO for the purpose of
analyzing and identifying possible solutions to the pending crisis;
implementation of automatic and seamless transitional safeguard
mechanisms for the purpose of "massive disruptive surges of trade
from a few countries;" and enactment of expedited and effective
remedies to "all types of unfair trading practices employed by
certain major supplying countries," including currency
manipulation, state sponsored subsidies, and state non-performing
loans.62
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Press Release, Foreign Trade Ass'n, Instanbul Declaration Has No Future,
(June 14, 2004) (on file with the Foreign Trade Association), http://www.fta-
eu.org/en/new/pmdpdf.phpsite=fta&pmid=79.
60 International Labor Organization, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/
index.htm.
61 Id.
62 See Istanbul Declaration Partners in the Global Alliance for Fair Trade in
Textiles and Clothing Brussels, June 17, 2004, Brussels Communique 1-2,
http://www.deik.org.tr/genel/ 2004625141610brusselscommunique-june2004.pdf. Key
provisions of the Istanbul Declaration follow.
1. Request an emergency meeting of the WTO in order to analyze and identify
WTO solutions to the pending crisis associated with the expiration of textile and
clothing quotas on January 1, 2005. These could include an extension of the
current system, the development of a new system or the use of other WTO
mechanisms.
2005]
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In the United States, the response to the termination of the
ATC has been mixed and seemingly drastic.63 In October and
November 2004, a United States trade and clothing industry
coalition and a labor union filed nine threat-based safeguard
petitions on quotas that expired on January 1, 2005 against
trousers, shirts, underwear, cotton yam, and synthetic filament
fabrics from China.64 In addition, the coalition also filed three
separate petitions, requesting that the United States extend
safeguards on four trade and clothing categories from China that
expired on December 23, 2004: knit fabrics, brassieres, dressing
gowns, and robes.65
The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) granted
preliminary injunctive relief on December 30, 2004 in response to
a complaint filed by the United States Association of Importers of
Textiles and Apparel.66 Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant
pending these legal proceedings, "from accepting, considering, or
taking any further action on requests filed under the procedures
issued by the Committee for the Implementation of Textile
Agreements ... that are based on the threat of market disruption
upon the elimination of quotas or safeguards on textile or textile
products from... China. '' 67 In granting this temporary relief, the
2. Implement automatic and seamless transitional safeguard mechanisms in
order to prevent massive disruptive surges of trade from a few countries. The
damage associated with the removal of a limited number of quotas in 2002
under the third stage of the phase-out must not be repeated. For example,
during that removal, almost all the benefits went to a single supplier, which
significantly cut prices.
3. Demand expedited and effective remedies to all types of unfair trading
practices employed by certain major supplying countries, including currency
manipulation, state sponsored subsidies and state provided non-performing
loans, among others. Id.
63 Cf. Nords, supra note 53, at 26. This simulation of the impact of phasing out
ATC quotas, predicts, "Since the United States/Canada has the most restrictive quotas,
the impact on import share of total demand is the most dramatic here. The import share
in clothing will increase by as much as a third according to the model simulations." Id.
64 See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Developments in the Textiles and
Clothing Trade: Impact of Quota Elimination from 2005, http://www.tdctrade
.com/econforum/tdc/tdc05OlO3.htm.
65 Id.
66 See U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles and Apparel v. United States, 350 F. Supp.
2d 1342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
67 Id. at 1344.
[Vol. 31
2005] WTO AND LEGALIZED TRADE DISTORTION
CIT considered several factors, including the immediate and
irreparable injury to the plaintiff, the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, the likelihood of success on the merits
by the plaintiff, and what would best serve the public interest.68
However, upon a showing of sufficient evidence of a market
disruption caused by a surge in imports, the granting of
preliminary injunctive relief will not stay safeguard quotas.69
China's accession to the WTO contains a temporary special
protection clause (the Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard
Clause in section 16 of the WTO Protocol on Accession) that may
be invoked until 2008 by either the United States or the European
Union if their home markets are threatened by excessive imports
of textiles and clothing products.7 ° In addition, general safeguard
68 Id. at 1346.
69 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, supra note 64; See also Hong Kong
Trade Development Council, Update on China Safeguard Litigation: CIT Denies
Government Request for a Stay, Feb. 22, 2004, http://www.tdctrade.con/alert/
us0503c.htm.
The US government submitted a notice of intent to appeal to the US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) on 26 January, and one day later filed a
motion with the CIT requesting a "stay" of the injunction pending conclusion of
the appellate proceedings. The CIT denied the stay request four days after it
was filed, leaving the injunction in place. The CIT also refused to respond to a
request by the US Sock Manufacturers and Distributors Coalition to clarify the
scope of the preliminary injunction. The initial suit covered the safeguard
action on socks and the Coalition requested that the judge force CITA to lift the
associated quota. The safeguard limit on socks therefore remains in place. The
US government has filed an additional motion to stay the preliminary injunction
with the CAFC, and is also requesting an expedited briefing schedule at that
court for its appeal of the injunction. USA-ITA, the plaintiff in this case, has
announced that it will "strongly oppose the stay motion" and advised the US
government that it supported an expedited schedule, but not the schedule
proposed by the Government. The US Government filed an appeal brief with
the CAFC on 14 February 2005. Id.
70 See ERIc HEYMANN, WTO TEXTILE AGREEMENT Now EXPIRES: CHINA
MATURING INTO WORLD'S TAILOR 26, (Hans-Joachim Frank ed. 2005), http://www.
dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PRODOOOOOOOOOO 84480.pdf; see
also WTO, PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 9, 11
(2001), http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L432.doc [hereinafter
PROTOCOL ON ACCESSION]; see also TERENCE P. STEWART, U.S.-CHINA SECURITY AND
ECON. REv. COMM'N, CHINA'S COMPLIANCE WITH WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
OBLIGATIONS 64 (2004), http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/20O4/stewartpaper/
04_03_19finalreport.pdf. The Transitional Review Mechanism or process is unique to
China and is required by Article 18 of the Protocol on Accession, [hereinafter TRM].
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provisions for many products, including textiles and clothing
products, are possible until 2013.71
In Europe, the situation has been no less dramatic as the
European Union also braces itself to respond to this potential
global economic crisis. In February 2005, soon after a similar
request by Portugal, Italy requested the European Commission
(EC) place a limit on imports of textiles from mainland China.72
Italy claimed that Chinese products flooded the European Union
markets following the termination of the ATC.73
In March 2005, the European Union Commission released
provisional anti-dumping findings regarding certain finished
polyester filament apparel fabrics (FPFAF), which are woven
fabrics of synthetic filament yam containing eighty-five percent or
more by weight of textured or non-textured polyester filaments,
dyed or printed, and normally used for apparel applications.74
FPFAF is used for making anoraks, sports wear, ski wear,
underwear, lining for clothing, and other fashion items.75 The
EC's findings resulted in the imposition of provisional duties on
all exporting producers from China.76  AIUFASS,77  acting on
Id.; see also Joel P. Trachtman, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-made Fibre Underwear, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 402 (1998), http://www.ejil.org
/joumallVol9/No2/sr3.rtf (analyzing the WTO Appellate Body report addressing
causation and proof of serious damage and interpreting the ATC).
71 See HEYMANN, supra note 70; see also International Trade Center, Extract of
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China - Special Textile and Clothing
Safeguards against China, http://www.intracen.org/textilesandclothing/accession-of_
china.htm.
72 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Threat of Safeguards Against Chinese
Textiles Looms Larger, May 2005, http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/eu0505.htm.
73 Id.
74 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Provisional Findings Published in
Textiles Anti-dumping Case, Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/eu0506c.htm
("Findings published in the Official Journal of 16 March 2005 under Commission
Regulation 426/2005.").
75 Id.
76 Id,
77 The International Association of Users of Artificial and Synthetic Filament
Yams and of Natural Silk is an affiliate of Euratex. Euratex is the European Apparel and
Textile Organisation which "acts on behalf of the European textile and clothing industry
with European institutions on matters of common interest, relating to decisions or
legislation affecting the industry." Euratex.org, About Euratex, http://www.euratex.org/.
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behalf of several EC producers, initiated the proceeding on June
17, 2004.78 An investigation revealed that exporting producers
were selling this product to the European Union at a price lower
than on their domestic market.79 There were significant increases
in volumes and market shares of imports from China, which
significantly undercut the prices of the EC industry.80 The EC
concluded such imports injured the EC industry and thus duties
should be imposed.8' Most importantly, this proceeding and
subsequent findings indicate how the European Union may deal
with future anti-dumping cases involving textiles from China.82
On May 22, 2005, the European Union also indicated that it had
no desire at that time to impose quotas on China, but needed to
ensure appropriate management of future textile exports because a
surge of cheap textile and clothing shipments may require
quotas.83
In an earlier response to concerns of trading partners and in
anticipation of the termination of the ATC on January 1, 2005,
China imposed tariffs on six categories of textile exports
commencing on the same date. 84 China announced that it would
collect export tariffs, ranging from 0.2 yuan to 0.3 yuan (2.4-3.6
U.S. cents) for every piece or set on 148 types of clothing.85 On
January 1, 2005, many countries removed textile-trading quotas as
scheduled, including the United States, the European Union, and
Canada.86  In addition, on May 20, 2005, China's Tariff
Committee of the State Council decided, for the second time, to
impose export duties on another 74 ten-digit tariff lines. 7 China's
78 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, supra note 74.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 EU Not Desired to Reimpose Quotas on China's Textiles, CHINA DAILY, May 22,
2005, http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/22/content_444633.htm.
84 See Dai Yan, Textile Export Curbs to Remain, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 5, 2005,
http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/05/content406099.htm; see also
Dai Yan, Textile Tariff Details Unveiled, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 28, 2004,
http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/28/content_403844.htm.
85 See also Textile Tariff Details Unveiled, supra note 84.
86 Dai, Textile Export Curbs to Remain, supra note 84.
87 Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Commerce Minister
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MOFCOM imposed export tariffs to address concerns of trade
partners. 88  However, China's self-imposed voluntary export
tariffs, or voluntary export restraints (VERs), on certain exportable
commodities did not sufficiently belie global economy fears.
On May 14, 2005, the United States reimposed quotas, or more
accurately, emergency curbs, on three categories of textiles and
clothing imports from China.89 The import quotas both directly
addressed Chinese textiles and clothing and benefited some
developing countries such as India and Pakistan. 90 In particular,
the United States reimposed quota ceilings on cotton trousers
(categories 347/348), cotton knit shirts (categories 338/339), and
underwear (category 352) imported from China. A surge of
Chinese imports and fear of jobs being lost in the United States
prompted the reimposition of tariffs.9' According to United States
Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, since quotas were
eliminated on January 1, 2005, a surge in imports from China has
severely harmed domestic industry.92 As of July 12, 2005, unless
the United States and China sign a bilateral agreement increasing
the quota limits for certain categories of clothing so that if such
merchandise is shipped in excess of the applicable quota, it will
not be allowed United States entry until February 1, 2006.9' On
July 5, 2005, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Bo Xilai Attending Press Conference Hosted by the State Council Information Office,
ASIA REPORT, June 1, 2005, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/
asiareport/200506/20050600106396.html.
88 Id. ("Some foreign companies have predicted Chinese Textile goods, supported
by cheap labor costs, will flood the world market and force them out. Seventy-two textile
and apparel groups from [thirty-six] countries have even made the 'Istanbul Declaration'
to request the WTO extend quota-free deadlines until December 31, 2007, but it has
failed.")
89 See Parvaiz Ishfaq Rana, US Slaps Quotas on China's Clothing, DAWN THE
INTERNET EDITION, May 15, 2005, http://www.dawn.com/2005/05/15/ebrl .htm.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Four Safeguard Quotas Embargo in
July; Textile Industry Files Additional Petitions, July 21, 2005,
http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/us0514.htm. The agreement increased quota limits on
categories of cotton knitted shirts and blouses (category 33 8/339), cotton and man-made
fibre underwear (category 352/652), cotton trousers (category 347/348), and man-made
fibre knitted shirts and blouses (category 638/639). Id.
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(CBP), import of these categories of textiles and clothing came to
a halt as each of these limits had already been filled.94
In the meantime, on June 11, 2005, China and the European
Union executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MU) on
textiles and clothing.95 Under the terms of the MU and pursuant to
voluntary export restraints, "the annual growth of textile exports to
Europe for the ten lines of Chinese products is set to rise between
eight and 12.5 percent from June 11, 2005 through 2007."'96 The
agreement covers "ten lines of textile products," including "cotton
cloth, t-shirts, pullovers, trousers, blouses, sheets, dresses,
brassieres, table cloth and flax yarn. 97 According to the MU, the
European Union also agreed to stop investigations on ten
categories of textile products from China.98 According to Zhang
Hanlin, the director of the Research Institute on the WTO at
China's University of International Business and Economics,
"Pushed by the Sino-European Union agreement, the trade talks
between China and the United States on textile exports are
expected to make substantial progress in the near future." 99
During the 2005 annual meeting of the United States-China
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the parties
agreed that China would undertake specific actions in the areas of
protecting intellectual property rights, increasing market access for
U.S. goods and services, and accounting of subsidies, which is a
94 Id.
95 People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce, Sino-EU Textile Agreement
Sets Good Example for Future Trade Talks, ASIA REPORT, June 13, 2005,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/asiareport/200506/200506001170
58.html; see also Xinhua, German Textile Organization Chief Hails China-EU Deal on
Textile, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, June 17, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200506/17/
eng20050617_190736.html.
96 Xinhua, German Textile Organization Chief Hails China-EU Deal on Textile,
supra note 95.
97 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India, EU Agrees to Stop Probe
on Chinese Textile, REPORTS FROM CHINA, June 13, 2005, http://www.chinaembassy
.org.in/eng/zgbd/t199635.htm.
98 Id.
99 People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce, Sino-EU Textile Agreement
Sets Good Example for Future Trade Talks, ASIA REPORT, June 13, 2005,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/asiareport/200 56/20050600 170
58.html.
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Protocol on Accession yet to be fulfilled.'00 The countries also
jointly agreed to intensify discussions on structural issues related
to China's non-market status under U.S. anti-dumping laws,
including a review of China's subsidy practices.101 While the
parties discussed a potential agreement to limit Chinese textiles
and clothing exports, there were no specific breakthroughs.102 The
failure to reach a concrete agreement was in part attributable to
speculation that China might revalue its currency, which it did in
July 2005.113 The revaluation of the Chinese yuan, though slight
(only a 2.1 percent change in the yuan from its fixed value of 8.3
to the U.S. dollar), may have brought about concessions from both
Washington and Beijing. 10 For China, the revaluation may have
produced a trading partner more willing to reduce Chinese textiles
and clothing quota limits met on July 5, 2005. The United States,
although doubtful that the revalued yuan will reduce the U.S.-
China trade deficit, which topped at $162 billion in 2004, hopes to
placate domestic constituents and lobbyists, such as the U.S. Trade
and Clothing Industry Coalition and labor unions.0 5
100 U.S. Dept. of State, United States Issues Fact Sheet on JCCT Trade Talks with
China (Jul. 11, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Jul/12-405893.html; see
also Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, JCCT Press Conference
with USTR Portman, Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez and Agriculture
Secretary Michael Johans (Jul. 11, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/
Transcripts/2005/July/JCCT PressConference_withUSTRPortman,_CommerceSecr
etaryCarlos M._GutierrezAgricultureSecretary MichaelJohanns.html.
101 U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 100.
102 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, U.S.-China Achieve Concrete Results
at JCCT Talks, July 21, 2005, http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/us0514.htm.
103 Andy Mukherjee, China Has Revalued Yuan; What Happens Next?,
Bloomberg.com, July 22, 2005, http://quote.bloomberg.cornapps/news?pid=
10000039&refer=-columnist mukherjee&sid=ayvzBLlp6Ipk.
104 Morris Goldstein & Nicholas R. Lardy, Op-Ed., China's Revaluation Shows Size
Really Matters, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2005, http://www.iie.com/publications/
opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchlD=528.
105 Bruce Odessey, Swiftly Expanding U.S.-China Economic Relations Stir Debate,
Mar. 2, 2005, U.S. Department of State, International Information Program,
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Mar/03-588739.htm; see, e.g., M. Ulric
Killion, China's Foreign Currency Regime: The Kagan Thesis and Legalification of the
WTO Agreement, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43, 49-53, 61-65 (2004) (discussing the
China yuan controversy, U.S.-China trade policy and domestic constituents, and
lobbyists).
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C. The Political Economy of China
The 2004 ASEAN-China Accord, in conjunction with
termination of the ATC, presents issues of China-led regionalism.
More specifically, the accord and termination raise the question of
whether there is a distinctive model of Chinese regionalism that
threatens multilateral world trade. China's approach to regional
integration may be unilateral or multilateral. Generally, regional
trade agreements are analyzed in terms of the conventional or
orthodox model of market-led cooperative regionalism,'0 6 a model
of regionalism that complements, rather than threatens,
multilateral trade and the goals of the WTO. Notwithstanding
issues such as economic regionalization versus
economic regionalism, 10 7  or microregionalization versus
microregionalism, 108 economic globalization has presented the
paradoxical inter-relationship between what is more accurately
described as market-led regionalization and policy-led
regionalism. 109 Consequently, economic globalization produced a
paradoxical conflict between market transactions (market actors in
bottom to top process) and state policies (state actors in top to
bottom process) seeking to manage an integrating social space
106 See, e.g., Warwick J. McKibbin & Wing Thye Woo, The Consequences of
China's WTO Accession on its Neighbours (Oct. 18, 2002) (on file with the University
of Michigan), http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu/CEDS papers/WooWingThye.pdf; Linda
Low, East Asian Regionalism: Would that Help Globalisation, Growth and
(In)Equality?, Paper for Globalisation, Growth and (In) Equality, 5th Centre for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Annual Conference, coorganized by
University of Warwick, CSGR and Economic &V Social Research Council, University
of Warwick (March 15-17, 2002), http://ww.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/GSGR/PLow.pdf,
citing John G. Ikenberry, The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism, 11 ASIAN ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 35 (2000).
107 See Mark Beeson, Re-thinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in
Comparative Historical Perspective, at 3, Paper presented at the Oceanic Conference on
International Studies, Canberra (July 14-16, 2004).
Consequently, much recent scholarship about regional processes makes a basic
distinction between regionalism and regionalization. In this formulation,
regionalism refers to the political process in which states drive cooperative
initiatives. Regionalization, by contrast, refers to processes of economic
integration which, while they may be influenced by state policies, are
essentially the uncoordinated consequence of private sector activities. Id.
108 See, e.g., Shaun Breslin, Decentralisation, Globalisation and China's partial Re-
engagement with the Global Economy, 5 NEW POL. ECoN. 207 (2000).
109 Id.
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across sub-national, interregional, and international borders." I 0 As
the role of state actors and their attendant policies and practices
become increasingly relevant in measuring regional integration,
political economy environments arguably serve as indicators of the
directional development of this paradoxical conflict, especially
when seeking to measure the international trade practice and
policies of socialist-political polities such as China. For instance,
notwithstanding political motivations, in China the political
economy forces driving economic integration have been resource
endowments and differing developmental levels (foreign capital
and technology, and domestic land and labor) in pursuit of export-
based growth."' However, China's most important problems are
its political economy environment and inclusive political
motivations, which arguably produce unconventional and
unorthodox approaches to economic growth, economic
development, and especially regional integration. The latter is
problematic because it suggests that China's polity may be
pursuing an international trade policy focusing on unilateral
liberalization, rather than multilateral liberalization. All of this
might pose a threat to the multilateral world trading system.
In terms of the globalization of China, many commentators
advocate a "big bang" approach to transition from socialism to
capitalism in legal reform and economic development.112 Many
argue that speed is of the essence, because there was a "window of
opportunity" (or a honeymoon period or a period of exceptional
politics) created by the establishment of a democracy." 3 During
this period, some scholars contend, "governments should adopt
reforms as fast as possible and attempt to make them
irreversible.""..4  Despite the many proponents of a "big bang"
approach, China has been relatively successful in its "gradualist"
approach to transition.
110 Id.
II1 See Robert F. Ash & Y.Y. Kueh, Economic Integration within Greater China:
Trade and Investment Flows Between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, in GREATER
CHINA: THE NEXT SUPERPOWER? 60 (David Shambaugh, ed., 1995).
112 See Gerard Roland, The Political Economy of Transition 37-38 (William
Davidson Institute, Working Paper No. 413, 2002), http://wdi.umich.edu/files/
Publications/WorkingPapers/wp413.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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To the disdain of Western models of development, China's
ongoing transition to a market economy has occurred without
democratization, liberalization has been slow and incremental, and
privatization has been delayed. 115 In the past two decades, the
Western world witnessed remarkable success in its reforms.
China, India, and other Asian countries liberalized trade and
investment, but did so in an unorthodox manner; that is, gradually,
sequentially, and only after an initial period of high growth, all of
which occurred within the confines of broader policy packages
with unconventional features.'1 6  Nonetheless, China, if not
China's polity, is struggling for survival in terms of domestic,
regional, and international relations. On the domestic front, China
faces problems directly relating to such issues, which present
overriding political economy concerns that affect Chinese policy
in politics, economics, and trade.
China's distinctiveness lies in the fact that accession followed
the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union and Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA), which was the
economic and trading system of East European countries
connected to the Soviet Union.' I The breakup of the Soviet
Union created the possibility of additional transition economies
seeking General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
membership."l 8 Since the rules of accession for China may serve
as a model for additional transitional economies, Western
developed countries implicitly created special conditions and
rigorous accession terms for China." 9  For this reason, China
presents a classic example of ongoing legal and economic reform,
115 See Dani Rodrik, Globalization Is No Shortcut to Development, BEYOND
TRANSITION (World Bank Group, Washington, D.C.), July-Sept. 2001.
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 273 (Glenn E. Curtis ed.,
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 1992),
http://www.shsu.edu/-his-ncp/CMEA.html ("The Founding of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (also referred to as Comecon, CMEA, CEMA, or the Council)
dates from a 1949 communiqu6 agreed upon by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.").
118 See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 61-
63 (Brookings Institute 2002); see also PROTOCOL ON ACCESSION, supra note 70; TRM,
supra note 70.
119 LARDY, supra note 118.
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or institutional reform, prompted, at least in part, by both the WTO
Protocol on Accession and Trade Review Mechanism (TRM). In
terms of Western development taxonomies, China remains a non-
market economy transitioning to a market economy under
standards imposed by both the WTO Protocol on Accession and
the TRM.120
China's accession to the WTO in 2001 was not the end of the
transformation of its trading system and accession obligations.
WTO members determined that China needed to accomplish
substantial changes before it would be in full compliance with the
accession obligations. For this reason, an annual monitoring
mechanism was created that focused on China's compliance with
the obligations of WTO membership. 22  In the Protocol on
Accession, China agreed to an annual review of the
implementation process, known as the TRM. Commenced in
2002, the TRM will operate for eight consecutive years, followed
by one final review of China's compliance and implementation
process in the tenth year subsequent to accession. 124  For China,
compliance entails, at a minimum, a commitment to the WTO goal
of multilateral trade, if not to a model of regionalism that
complements multilateral trade.
China continues to experience rapid economic growth and is
hailed by many as exemplary in its open door policy. 125 However,
economic liberalization in China is best described as "relative"
economic liberalization. 126 Pursuant to the Protocol on Accession
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See Monitoring and Enforcement of the People's Republic of China's WTO
Commitments, 22 U.S.C. § 6931 (2000). The United States, for example, explicitly
made an annual review of China's compliance with its WTO obligations an element of
its national trade policy. In the bill that extended nondiscriminatory treatment (normal
trade relations treatment) to the People's Republic of China, Congress expressly
provided, "It shall be the objective of the United States to obtain as part of the Protocol
of Accession of the People's Republic of China to the VTO, an annual review within the
WTO of the compliance by the People's Republic of China with its terms of accession to
the WTO." Id.
123 See PROTOCOL ON ACCESSION, supra note 70.
124 PROTOCOL ON ACCESSION, supra note 70; TRM, supra note 70.
125 See Sebastian Mallaby, China: A Better Economic Global Citizen Than Guessed,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2005.
126 For purposes of this article, China's relative liberalization reflects the degree of
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and the TRM, liberalization occurs in all sectors of an economy.
China's relative liberalization is evidenced by several factors, 127
such as a growing disparity in income between the rich and
poor,12  a disparity in economic development between coastal
regions and western provinces, 129 and remnants of Soviet style
planning, a command system. 13 ° As one source observed, "China
China's integration into the global economy, in terms of deep integration versus swallow
integration. See U.S.-China Security Review Comm. Technical Briefing on Business,
Trade, and Economic Issues: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Security Review Comm.,
107th Cong. 1425 (2002) (statement of Nicholas R. Landy) ("Despite this extraordinary
performance, China remained in certain respects only shallowly integrated into the world
economy.").
127 See id. (explaining that critical sectors of the Chinese economy remains
relatively insulated from international competition); see also Mari Pangestu & Debbie
Mrongowius, Telecommunications Services in China: Facing the Challenges of WTO
Accession, in CHINA AND THE WTO: ACCESSION, POLICY REFORM, AND POVERTY
REDUCTION STRATEGIES 157 (Deepak Bhattasali, William J. Martin, and Li Shantong,
eds., 2004) ("China's telecommunications sector since the country's accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) remains one of the most restricted and regulated of
those in the major developing countries in the region.").
128 See, e.g., GUANGHUA WAN & ZHANGYUE ZHOU, INCOME INEQUALITY IN RURAL
CHINA REGRESSION BASED DISTRIBUTION USING HOUSEHOLD DATA 2 (2004),
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2004/rps2OO4/rp2004-051 .pdf#search
='income%20inequality%20in%20rural%20china%3A%20regressionbased'; see also
Pangestu & Mrongowius, supra note 127.
129 See also HUIJIONG WANG, INTEGRATED STUDY OF CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT AND
REFORM PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEM 105-106 (Beijing, Foreign
Language Press 2003) (discussing China's regional development strategies and
problems) ("China is now at the primary stage of socialism. It is pointed out by President
Jiang Zemin that 'It is a stage in which a society with very uneven economic and cultural
development among regions will become one in which the gap will be gradually
narrowed ... ').
130 See Toshiki Kanamori & Zhijun Zhao, Private Sector Development in the
People's Republic of China, ASIAN DEV. BANK INST. (Oct. 2004)
http://www.adbi.org/book/2004/l0/07/602.private.sector.prc/ ("The market economy is
an opposing concept to the command or planned economy in the PRC."); see also Peter
Batey, Capitalism and Compromise, CHINA REV. MAG. Spring 2003,
http://www.gbcc.org.uk/crmag.htm ("China is still far from being a market economy,
though it has moved some way from the old Stalinist command economy system. The
role of the Party and government in business remains all pervading, and even if the
mechanisms for detailed intervention in economic management are gradually being
dismantled, there is little doubt that a residual power to intervene at will remains.");
Prabhat Patnaik, China in a Globalized World, FRONTLINE, Oct. 9-22, 1999,
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1621/16210120.htm.
Thirdly, to call China a neo-liberal "model" is a travesty. China's success
during the reform years has sprung precisely from the fact that it has managed
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is still far from being a market economy, though it has moved
some way from the old Stalinist command economy system."'
' 31
The 2004 report of the United States-China Economic and
Security Commission noted some progress by China in meeting its
WTO accession commitments, but concluded that China "still
maintains non-tariff barriers and is erecting new non-tariff barriers
that harm United States interests by effectively limiting market
access for United States goods and services."' 132  The report
charged China with frustrating the effectiveness of the TRM, thus
preventing the TRM from becoming an effective mechanism for
assessing compliance and for placing multilateral pressure on
China to address shortfalls. 133  As the United States-China
Economic and Security Review Commission stated in its 2004
annual report to Congress, "[United States] business groups that
lobbied hard in favor of granting Permanent Normal Trade
Relations (PNTR) status to China in 1999-2000, and applauded
China's entry into the WTO, are now expressing concerns over the
pace and scope of WTO compliance."' 134  The representative
groups are the United States-China Business Council, American
Chamber of Commerce in China, United States Chamber of
to combine in an altogether novel way the virtues of centralisation with those of
decentralisation, or, putting it differently, the advantages of a command
economy alongside the flexibility imparted by the functioning of markets. It
has been, if you like, a command economy at one remove.
131 Batey, supra note 130.
132 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 108TH CONG., 2004
REPORT TO CONGRESS 61 (Comm. Print 2004), http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/
2004/04annual-report.pdf [hereinafter REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT]; see also U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE 1
(2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2004/asset_
upload file28 l6986.pdf.
This report is the third report prepared pursuant to section 421 of the U.S.-China
Relations Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-286), 22 U.S.C. § 6951 (the Act), which requires the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to report annually to Congress on
compliance by the People's Republic of China (China) with commitments made in
connection with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), including both
multilateral commitments and any bilateral commitments made to the United States. The
report also incorporates the findings of the Overseas Compliance Program, as required
by section 413(b)(2) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6943(b)(2).
133 See PROTOCOL ON ACCESSION, supra note 70.
134 REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 132, at 67.
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Commerce, and National Association of Manufacturers.135
China's newly erected barriers to trade, which, when taken in
conjunction with unaddressed compliance issues, create another
problem because they challenge China's commitment to the
multilateral world trading system. According to the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Commission, the shortcomings of China's
accession commitments are:
Continued direct and indirect subsidies to Chinese producers,
including preferred and sometimes unserviced loans from
stateowned banks, and free or discounted utility services;
rampant abuse and lax enforcement of intellectual property
rights; poor transparency in adopting and applying regulations;
the use of unjustified safety standards to exclude foreign
products-including non-science-based sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) standards on agricultural products and the
China Compulsory Certification of safety; the use of unjustified
technical standards to exclude foreign products or force foreign
producers into joint ventures with Chinese firms for production
aimed at the Chinese market; denial of equal tax treatment to
foreign products; barriers to specific services, such as financial
services and express couriers; obstacles to domestic distribution
of products by foreign companies, which severely curtails the
ability of foreign companies to gain market share and forces
them to sacrifice control over portions of the profit margin; and
forced transfers of technology. 
136
The unaddressed compliance issues bring into question
China's commitment to trade and investment liberalization and the
goals of the WTO, especially a commitment to a model of
regionalism that complements, rather than threatens, multilateral
trade.
As previously mentioned, China's non-orthodox "gradualist"
approach to economic development has been relatively successful.
However, despite evolving into a major world player in gross trade
volume, China presents an anomaly in terms of international
politics and trade relations. External forces that China perceives
as threats to internal security, including global terrorism,
geopolitical changes in world politics, pro-democracy movements,
135 Id.
136 Id. at 65.
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the war in Iraq, and North Korea nuclear talks, present problems
for neo-liberalism and its prescription of democracy for Chinese
society. 137 These perceived threats, whether real or not, influence
ongoing legal reform and economic development.
At first sight, the economic data is impressive. Since initiating
reform and an open-door policy some twenty-five years ago, the
Chinese economy has experienced high rates of growth.
Economic barometers show an average annual growth rate of 9.5
percent from 1978 to 1995, and double-digit rates for four
consecutive years, from 1992 to 1995.138 In 2003, projections
from China indicated that China's economy would grow at the rate
of eight percent in 2004 and FDI would continue to grow
rapidly. 3 9  In 2003, China's foreign trade ministry predicted
China's GDP for 2004 would be seven percent higher than in
2003.14° In 2005, China's annual economic growth prediction in
terms of GDP is nine percent.
41
Despite economic data presenting a case for ongoing
successful globalization in terms of global trade, there remain
tremendous legal, socioeconomic, and political issues confronting
China. When one juxtaposes the economic data with the plight of
the Chinese people and many problems confronting domestic
China, the picture grows dimmer. In select areas of China, such as
Shanghai and other coastal cities, one witnesses a seemingly
surreal growth of materialism and consumerism. While rural
Chinese, especially farmers, struggle for mere subsistence, 46.8
percent of the Chinese population live under a media-fabricated
myth that they are part of a growing middle class. 142 In 2003, the
137 See Jianwei Wang, Tough Road Ahead for China's Foreign Minister, ASIA
TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ED02Ad0 1.html.
138 See John Wong, China's Post-Deng Xiaoping Economy: Problems and
Prospects, (Int'l Univ. of Japan Research Inst., Working Paper No.1, 1997),
http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/wpap001.cfm.
139 Id.
140 See Fu Jing, Rosy Forecast of Economic Growth, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 6, 2003;
see also Lena Lee, Foreign Investors, Retail Sales Set the Pace in China, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Mar. 26, 2004, at A2; see also China set 7% growth target for 2004, News
Guangdong (via China Daily), Dec. 3, 2003, http://www.newsgd.com/business/
prospective/200312030031.htm.
141 See Developments in Selected Non-member Economies, at 2 (preliminary edition,
OEDC Economic Outlook No. 77, 2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/11/20213290.pdf.
142 See Pepe Escobar, The Great Wall of Shopping, ASIAN TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 14,
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average per capita disposable income in urban areas was 8472
yuan ($1033) a year, while for farmers it was only 2622 yuan
($319) a year. 143 China's agricultural economy now employs
about fifty percent of the labor force. 144  They are members of
China's lowest average income group, which constitutes about 630
million persons or half of China's population, comprising mostly
the poverty-stricken, ethic minority, rural areas and remote areas,
in the central and western regions.
145
Although a consensus has been reached concerning the
increasing trend in income inequality in China, the same does not
hold true regarding the causes of this trend. 4 6 China's population
peaked in January 2005 at 1.3 billion; the country expects
corresponding peaks in elderly populations and migrant
populations (rural to urban) as well as a growing imbalance in
gender proportions. 147  In the face of a burgeoning population,
China's domestic policy of the 4-2-1 phenomenon (si-er-yi jiating
jiegou), or having four grandparents and two parents to support
will continue to put China's only children under great financial
strain. 14  Notwithstanding an abatement of this growth trend in
population, which has been a worsening trend since the 1970s, the
predicted result is growing income disparities that will adversely
2005, http://atimes.com/atimes/China/GA14Ad04.html.
143 Id.
144 Angang Hu & Yizhi Xiong, The Strategy of Knowledge-based Development:
China's Long-run Future, SOC. SCI. IN CHINA (Zhongguo shehui kexue), Winter 2003, at
24-25.
145 Id.
146 GUANGHUA & ZHANGYUE, supra note 128, at 1; see also Pangestu &
Mrongowius, supra note 127.
147 See China's Population Hits 1.3 Billion, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005,
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050103-091210-4944r.htm.
148 Fu Jing, More Capital to Tackle Pension Deficit, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 28, 2005.
China's Ministry of Labor and Social Security has forecasted that the number of
retired persons living in urban areas will increase to 70 million in 2010, and
then to 100 million by 2020. In urban areas, there are currently 48 million
persons of pension age, but only 44.9 percent of urban employees and 85.4
percent of retired persons are covered by pension plans, while most farmers are
outside the pension system. While it has been suggested that the retirement age
be increased from now 55 for women and 60 for men to 65 for everyone, such a
solution will only exacerbate the current job situation of 10 million unemployed
persons. Id.
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affect China's ability to maintain sustainable growth and will
eventually contribute to undermining social and political
stability. 149
The latter problems are a symptom of the proclivity of China's
polity to employ ideological remedies in response to domestic,
regional, and international problems. One such example is former
President Jiang Zemin's doctrine of "The Theory of the Three
Represents" (San Ge Daibiao), which was constitutionalized in an
amendment to the 1982 China Constitution on March 14, 2004."'
The 2004 constitutional amendments incorporated the "Three
Represents" into "the Constitution's preamble as one of the
guiding principles of the nation, together with the heritage and
further development of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought
and Deng Xiaoping Theory."' 15 ' The "Three Represents" said the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) means "the party must represent
China's advanced productive forces, an orientation towards
advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the
overwhelming majority of the people in China."'152 The "Three
Represents" is generally perceived as either widening party ranks
by inclusion of capitalists and entrepreneurs, or conversely,
creating deeper divisions between the rich and poor. 15  However,
most importantly, the "Three Represents" indicates the problems
inherent in the Chinese economy, especially survivability of a
socialist polity in a world market economy.
China's problems are many and varied, especially since it is
jointly pursuing a socialist-political polity and capitalist-economic
policy. The latter incongruence will never resolve to an effective
149 See GUANGHUA & ZHANGYUE, supra note 128.
150 See Jiang's Book on Party Building Published, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Nov.
11, 2001, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200111/08/eng200l1108_84158.shtml. "On
Party Building" (Lun Dang De Jianshe) is a 300,000 Chinese character book containing
fifty-four speeches of Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the CPC from December 1989
until September 2001. Id.
151 Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 23, 2003,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/23/content_292557.htm.
152 Id.
153 Barbara Foley, From Situational Dialectics to Pseudo-Dialectics: Mao, Jiang,
and Capitalist Transition, CULTURAL LOGIC, 2002, http://eserver.org/clogic/
2002/foley.html; see also Joseph Kahn, China Moves to Protect Property, but the Fine
Print Has a Caveat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at Al.
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domestic, regional, and international development policy because
of a political economy shrouded in the ideology of a governing
party, the CCP. Governing polities such as the CCP will often
compete by placing party survival and ideology, such as the
"Three Represents," above other concerns, both domestic and
global. In terms of the survival of China's CCP, the problems with
reforms and the resulting problems in Marx-Leninist institutions
necessitates the development of new and different state
capacities." 4  However, continuing economic growth and
improvement in living standards, in conjunction with the ideology
of the "Three Represents," may provide China's polity with some
degree of latitude in restructuring more stable institutions.155
Notwithstanding problems of a socialist-political government
pursuing a capitalist-economic policy, another potential problem
for China, as noted by a recent Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) study, is that the forces
driving China's growth are losing their dynamism.'56 Continuing
economic growth in China may boil down to how China manages
its macro economy, especially its monetary policy. Also of
concern is how China deals with the liabilities of a developing and
struggling banking sector and pension system.'57 However, as one
critic noted, "So long as the market is contaminated by party
politics and state planning, corruption will continue to pollute
China's economic environment."' 58
Domestic and international concerns in the political economy
environment of China will affect Chinese international trade
154 See Barrett L. McCormick, Political Change in China and Vietnam: Coping with
Consequences of Economic Reform, in TRANSFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM 153, 161-162
(Anita Chan et. al. eds., 1999) (providing a defense of socialist democracy).
155 Id.
156 See OECD, China in the World Economy, The Domestic Policy Challenges, at 9-
10 (2002); see also AME Info.com, The China growth story to 2020, Jan. 14, 2005,
http://www.ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/52154.html ("China's growth story seems
never-ending. However, average growth of 9% each year over the last twenty-five years
cannot last forever. China's economy will mature, and its fast rates of growth will
calm.").
157 See, e.g., Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzi Chinn & Eiji Fuji, THE CHINESE ECONOMIES
IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND ITS DETERMINANTS (2003),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 101 3&context+sccie.
158 See James A. Dom, China's Spontaneous Order, THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON
LIBERTY, Apr. 1999, at 24-25.
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policy, especially China's approach to regionalism. China's polity
exhibits a proclivity to employ ideological solutions in answer to
societal problems. Given such proclivity, China's leaders may
increasingly interject ideological and even political concerns into
developing a distinctive Chinese model of regionalism. For
example, China's decision to use FTAs was motivated by ideology
and a desire to ensure ASEAN was China's first FTA partner.
Chinese regionalism, primarily motivated by political
considerations, presents an issue of whether Chinese regionalism
threatens or complements multilateral trade.
D. The WTO Rules
Generally, FTAs are governed by Article XXIV of GATT
1947,1'9 and the various trade agreements are generally described
as follows:
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are agreements among a
set of countries involving preferential treatment of bilateral trade
between any two parties to the agreement relative to their trade
with the rest of the world. Preferences, however, need not
extend to all trade between the two, and the coverage could
depend on the type of PTAs. Customs unions and the so-called
free trade areas are common forms of PTAs. Members of most
PTAs belong to a well-defined geographical area, such as for
example, the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). For this reason regional PTAs are called Regional
Trade Agreements (RTAs). The most common form of RTAs
are the euphemistically named Free Trade Areas (FTAs), with
few Customs Unions (CUs) which require the partners to
maintain a common external trade policy, in addition to free
trade with each other. 160
An elemental principle embodied in the most-favored-nation
(MFN) clause is that trade must be conducted on a non-
discriminatory basis. 161  WTO members are bound to grant
159 See Free Trade Area Provision, supra note 20.
160 Srinivasan, supra note 17, at 1.
161 GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; see also
GATT, art. I (outlining most favored-nation treatment); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
101-02 (2002).
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treatment as favorable as they give to any country to each other in
both the application and administration of import-export duties
and charges. 162 The underlying philosophy of multilateral trade is
the idea that a combination of open markets, non-discrimination,
and global competition create conditions that are most conducive
to the national welfare of all nations. 
163
Exceptions to the aforementioned conditions are permitted
only when special circumstances exist, such as CUs, RTAs, or
FTAs, and when developing countries and economies need special
assistance.' 64 Article XXIV of GATT 1947 allows WTO members
to form CUs and FTAs. 165 Paragraph five reads, "The provisions
of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free
trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for
the formation of a customs union or of a free trade area." '166
Article XXIV permits such groupings as an exception to the
general rule of MFN treatment. 167 The purpose of Article XXIV is
to ensure that regional integration complements and does not
threaten the multilateral trading system.
168
Generally, the MFN clause in Article I of GATT and the WTO
prohibit countries from engaging in discriminatory practices
against one another. 169 However, FTAs and CUs are permissible
under Article XXIV so long as they eliminate, rather than just
lower, within-union trade barriers on "substantially all the
trade."'170 In addition, the duties and regulations that affect the
trade of members or aligned economies, such as FTAs or CUs,
with nonmembers or nonaligned economies are also required to be
no more restrictive than those that were in effect before such
162 See JACKSON, supra note 161.
163 See Moana Bhagabati, Regionalism vs. Multilateralism Debate, HINDU Bus.
LINE, Mar. 28, 2001, http://blonnet.com/2001/03/28/stories/042820mo.htm.
164 GATT, pt. IV, arts. XXXVI-XXXVII, XXVIII.
165 Free Trade Area Provision, supra note 20.
166 Id.
167 JACKSON, supra note 161, at 101-102.
168 Id.
169 GATT, supra note 161.
170 Free Trade Area Provision, supra note 20, paras. 5, 8(a), 8(b).
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groupings were set up.171 Finally, those countries that enact FTAs
and CUs are required to give notice to the WTO Council. 172
Contrary to trade and investment liberalization, as well as the
goals of the WTO, Article XXIV may implicitly permit, if not
legalize, trade diversion by FTAs. Ironically, an important feature
of multilateralism is the supposed absence of discrimination
among trading partners because multilateral trade engenders trade
and investment creation, and is welfare enhancing. 173 An assumed
characteristic of international trade agreements, such as NAFTA
and the European Union, is that by virtue of their nature as
international agreements, they frustrate protectionism. 174 Whether
these international agreements are actually welfare enhancing
rather than welfare reducing is another issue because this
conclusion does not necessarily apply to liberalization by a
selective group of nations. 171
Article XXIV has been referred to as the GATT loophole for
FTAs. 176 This clause, in effect, exempts FTAs and CUs from the
obligation set forth in Article I to accord MFN treatment. 177 This
loophole is justified for two historical reasons. First, during the
earlier post-World War II period, GATT was relatively successful
as trade barriers were substantially lowered, and the number of
contracting parties to GATT rose from twenty-three to more than
100.178 For purposes of encouraging membership in the newly
171 Id. at para. 5 (requiring trade barriers after integration do not rise on average).
172 Id.
173 See OECD, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S TRADE POLICIES AND THEIR ECONOMIC
EFFECTS 80 (2000).
174 See Stefan Szepesi, Coercion or Engagement?, Economics and Institutions in
ACP-EU Trade Negotiations 8 (Eur. Center for Dev. Pol'y Mgmt., Discussion Paper No.
56, June 2004), http://www.ecdpm.org/WebECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/
1098B04D025BE761C 1256EAD0039100E.
175 Id.
176 Srinivasan, supra note 17, at 2.
177 GATT, art. I (outlining most favored-nation treatment).
178 Volker Nitsch & Daniel M. Sturm, The Trade Liberalization Effects of Regional
Trade Agreements, 2005, at 2, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/-vnitsch/publications/05-01-
25.pdf.
The process of nondiscriminatory tariff reductions based on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was widely considered a success
story. Trade barriers were lowered dramatically, with the average ad valorem
tariff falling from over 40 percent to less than 4 percent ... ; the number of
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formed GATT (1947), the political reality of the post-World War
II era meant accommodating a long history of CUs that predated
GATT (1947)." 9  Second, exceptions were permitted under
specific or controlled conditions, intending to avoid ad hoc and
partial discrimination practiced during the interwar period. 8 °
However, the primary political force leading to the creation of
this loophole was the earlier formation of the European Economic
Community (EEC). In the late 1950s, contracting parties made a
conscious decision not to challenge the formation of the EEC so
that it would not withdraw from GATT.181 During this period,
EEC member states made it known that any discernable
inconsistency between the Treaty of Rome and Article XXIV
would have resulted in their withdrawal from GATT.182  This
earlier crisis created an unwanted precedent that was, and
continues to be, followed and at the same time produces an
increasing tolerance for regional integration agreements. 183
The WTO Memorandum of Understanding on Article XXIV
also fails to clear up existing ambiguities and contradictions,184
such as differences regarding how to define "substantially all the
trade," how to determine whether an external trade policy of an
FTA has become more restrictive on "average," and what is a
reasonable length of time for a transition to the full
implementation of an FTA. 185 As a result, Article XXIV remains a
contracting parties to GATT rose from 23 to more than 100; and growth in
world trade consistently out-paced the expansion in merchandise output. Id.
(citing Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, 89
AM. ECON. REv. 215 (Mar. 1999)).
179 Srinivasan, supra note 17, at 2.
180 Id. at 2-3.
181 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 353 (2d ed. 2001) (citing R. Snape, History and
Economics of GATT's Article XXIV, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL
TRADING SYSTEM (K. Anderson & R. Blackhurst eds., 2003)).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 WTO.org, WTO: Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
region-e/regatte.htm.
185 HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 181, at 353-54.
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continuing source of debate concerning FTAs. 8 6 The problem is
exasperated by the fact that only one working party has ever
determined that an FTA or RTA satisfied Article XXIV. 18 7 Since
1957 when the Treaty of Rome established the EEC, "almost no
examination of agreements notified under Article XXIV led to a
unanimous conclusion or specific endorsement that all the legal
GATT requirements had been met."' 8 8  A comment from the
chairperson of the working party for the 1989 Canada-United
States FTA reads, "[o]ver fifty previous working parties on
individual custom unions or free trade areas have been unable to
reach unanimous conclusions on the compatibility of these
agreements with the GATT-on the other hand, no such
agreement has been explicitly disapproved."' 8 9 One source noted
that as late as the 1980s, only four such working groups could
agree that a regional integration agreement actually met the
requirements of Article XXIV.' 90
In addition, no FTAs or RTAs have ever been found to be
incompatible with GATT. 9' A GATT Study Group concerning
Article XXIV reads, "[t]hey have set a dangerous precedent for
further special deals, fragmentation of the trading system, and
damage to the trade interests of non-participants ... GATT rules
on customs unions and free trade areas should be examined,
redefined so as to avoid ambiguity, and more strictly applied."'' 92
In the past, it was the providence of a working party, which was
created by the Council, to determine whether GATT criteria for an
FTA were met. In contrast, under the WTO rules, a Committee of
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) has taken over this task. 193
However, the same ambiguities and contradictions stemming from
186 See Kerry A. Chase, Multilateralism Compromised: The Mysterious Origins of
GATT Article XXIV (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Tufts
University), http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/chase/multilateralism.pdf (citing WTO,
WTO: REGIONALISM AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 63 (1995)).
187 Chase, supra note 186.
188 See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 181.
189 Id. (citing GATT Focus, Dec. 1991).
190 HOEKMAN & KOsTEcKj, supra note 181, at 353 (citing FREE TRADE AREAS AND
US TRADE POLICY (J. Schott ed., Institute for International Economics, 1989)).
191 Chase, supra note 186.
192 Id.
193 HOEKMAN & KoSmCKl, supra note 181, at 353.
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GATT remain in place under the WTO rules.194
Moreover, because of the inherent ambiguities and
contradictions of Article XXIV, GATT contracting parties were
allowed to develop further exceptions to Article XXIV by creating
special provisions intended to promote trade with developing
countries. These exceptions to Article XXIV were created with
the addition of Part IV in 1965'9' and the Enabling Clause in
1979.196 In 1965, the contracting parties added Part IV, Trade and
Development, to GATT. 197 Pursuant to the special provisions of
Part IV, GATT now gives high priority to the reduction or
elimination of tariffs on the products of least developed countries
(LDCs), refrains from introducing tariffs and non-trade barriers
(NTBs) to such imports, refrains from imposing internal taxes that
would discourage consumption of primary products from LDCs,
and does not require reciprocal commitments from LDCs. 98 In
1979, Part IV of GATT was further expanded by the previously
mentioned Enabling Clause, which consolidated the concepts of
differential and more favorable treatment for developing countries
and economies, and provided the principle of non-reciprocity in
trade.199 The Enabling Clause enabled developed countries to
194 Id. at 353-54.
195 GATT, part IV, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
196 Enabling Clause, supra note 18.
197 See WTO, The World Trade Organization: A Training Package (1998),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/eol/e/wtoO1/wtol_17.htm [hereinafter
WTO: Training]:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (both GATT 1947 and GATT
1994) contains a special section, in its Part IV, called "Trade and
Development." This section, added in 1965, recognizes the need for a rapid and
sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed countries. To
this effect, developed countries are called upon to take a number of best
endeavor commitments. These include according high priority to the reduction
and elimination of barriers to products currently or potentially of particular
interest to the developing countries, including customs duties and other
restrictions which differentiate unreasonably between such products in their
primary and in their processed forms. Part IV codifies in the multilateral
trading system the concept of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations between
developed and developing countries. Id.
198 See E. Kwan Choi, Faculty Page, Department of Economics, Iowa State
University, http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/gatt.htm.
199 WTO: Training, supra note 197.
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accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing
countries as a departure from the MFN Clause.2 °°
As a result, GATT contracting parties produced two important
exceptions to the requirements of Article XXIV. First, developed
countries were allowed one-way partial tariff preferences to
developing countries through an Article I exemption.20" Second,
the Enabling Clause allowed two-way partial tariff preferences
between developing countries under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). 20 2  Therefore, the multilateral world trading
system produced three categories of FTAs: (1) Article XXIV
arrangements involving FTAs and CUs; (2) Enabling Clause
arrangements limited to developing countries and permitting
partial preferences; and (3) Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) arrangements permitted via a grant of an exception to
Article 1.203
GATT contracting parties essentially created de facto FTAs,
which are not definable as de jure FTAs for purposes of Article
XXIV. Thus, these FTAs are not subject to the requirements of
Article XXIV, especially its requirements concerning trade
barriers to "substantially all the trade. ' ' 204  Consequently,
developing economies may now, by virtue of the loophole in
Article XXIV, invoke WTO rules allowing them to establish FTAs
or CUs that do not conform to the requirements of Article
XXIV.205 The Enabling Clause effected the removal of the
"substantially all the trade" test, while allowing for preferences
between developing economies. 2°6  The latter essentially voided
200 Id. The listed categories of such treatment are:
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to
products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized
System of Preferences;
(b) Differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of
the GATT concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of
instruments multilaterally negotiated under GATI (now WTO) auspices. Id.
201 PANAGARIYA, supra note 21, at 8.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 5-6.
205 HOEKMAN & KosTEci, supra note 181, at 355.
206 Id.
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the Article XXIV requirement of full removal of internal trade
barriers. 2 7 For developing countries, there is a resulting problem
of inconsistency between GATT and WTO rules because the
requirements of Article XXIV are far more demanding than the
Enabling Clause. 208  This issue deserves special attention, given
the prospect of FTAs comprising developing countries and
economies, which may be trade diverting and welfare reducing.
In addition, the inherent ambiguities and contradictions of
Article XXIV implicitly permit trade distortion and thus may
legalize trade distortion. A consequence of the WTO rules
tolerating trade distortion may lead to growing regionalism, which
may pose a threat to the WTO and multilateral trade goals of trade
and investment liberalization. Moreover, if WTO rules tolerate
closed and unilateral models of regionalism, then such rules foster
models of regionalism that may have a greater proclivity to
produce trade distortion and threaten multilateral trade. In terms
of GATT or the WTO, the critical issue is ascertaining the line
between models of regionalism that complement multilateral trade,
and models of regionalism so "distortionary" in nature that the
international trading system should no longer tolerate them.20 9 The
inherent problems of the WTO rules governing FTAs, such as
Article XXIV, are only exacerbated by the growing trend of
regionalism and the proliferation of FTAs, such as the proposed
ASEAN-China FTA.
E. Exclusionary FTAs
While the WTO Doha Development Agenda struggles towards
207 Id.; see also PANAGARIYA, supra note 21, at 5. "PTAs have, nevertheless, been
accommodated into GATT through Article XXIV, which allows Members to form such
arrangements provided they eliminate, rather than just lower, within-union trade barriers
on 'substantially all the trade.' The arrangements must also not raise trade barriers on
goods produced outside the union." Id. at 5. However, "trade barriers such as anti-
dumping, which are permitted by other provisions of GATT, can be maintained within
the union." Id. at 5, note 6.
208 PANAGARIYA, supra note 21, at 6.
209 Killion, supra note 105. "In terms of GATr, or the WTO, the critical issue is
ascertaining the line between governmental measures that are often taken for legitimate
domestic policy reasons, and measures so predatory in nature that the international
trading system should no longer tolerate them. The question of unilateralism is not well
regulated by either GATT or the WTO." Id. at 79.
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implementation, there are increasing numbers of FTAs.2 10
Between 1990-1994, the number of FFAs substantially jumped,
with twenty-nine new FTAs reported to the WTO. 21' From 1995-
1999, the number of FTAs grew by an additional sixty-four
agreements, twenty-eight involving transition economies.212 After
2000, FTAs between developing countries (South-South
agreements), and not FTAs between developed countries (North-
North agreements) or FTAs between developed and developing
countries (North-South agreements), constituted a large percentage
of the new FTAs reported to the WTO. 2 13 In a three-year period
(2000-2002), there was a fifty-five percent growth in the number
of new FIAs.214 The WTO estimates that there will be over 300
such regional trade arrangements by 2007.215
The proliferation of FTAs poses a threat to the WTO goal of
free trade because political motivations for entering FTAs may
override economic considerations.2 6  Regionalism is not a
problem in and of itself; it can be a building block towards greater
trade liberalization.217 However, regional trade arrangements can
also create more costly and complex trade regimes. 2 8  For
example, FTAs, and the associated growing costs and
administrative burdens resulting from the number of different
customs rules of origin, tariff schedules, and regulatory standards,
210 See Andrew L. Stoler, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Role and Goals of
the World Trade Organization 2 n. 4 (2004) (on file at the Institute for International
Business, Economics & Law, University of Adelaide).
211 WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 47 (2003), http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/
booksp.e/anrep-e/worldtrade-report_2003_e.pdf.
212 Id.
213 See Stoler, supra note 210, at 2-3 (citing WORLD TRADE REPORT 2003, 47
tbl.IB.9 (2003)); see also WTO.org, Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regface.htm.
214 Stoler, supra note 210.
215 Id.
216 See National Foreign Trade Council, Vision 2005: Free Trade and Beyond,
Recommendations for the Doha Development Agenda, May 22, 2002,
http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/NFrC_DohaRound- Position- Paper_.May2002.pdf
[hereinafter Vision 2005] (discussing the NFTC's "vision for the Doha agenda").
217 See generally J. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System,
Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics (1997) (discussing the benefits
of regionalism).
218 Vision 2005, supra note 216.
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219have proven particularly problematic for developing countries.
FTAs will result in tariff-free zones "throughout important regions
of the world while leaving high tariffs and other barriers in place
in other regions.,, 220 A growth in regionalism may pose a threat to
multilateral trade because of participating economy preferences to
keep the benefits gained from more limited and exclusionary
preferential trade arrangements.22'
The debate contrasting regionalism with multilateralism has
yet to be resolved.222 Some critiques perceive liberalization as the
cause of social and economic problems, rather than the solution.223
In this respect, Asian regional bodies adopted an incorrect model
by adopting a neo-liberal agenda.224 Other criticisms simply center
on the adoption of economic liberalization or neo-liberalism.225
This is mostly an issue of state sovereignty that results from
models of regionalism embracing both developed and developing
economies.22 6  Some development theorists, in challenging
liberalization as the best option, argue that the retention of state
control over strategic economic instruments and sectors provides
more options for development. 227  There are also criticisms that
focus on economic liberalization, in terms of whether it is
desirable, while others direct attention to a desirability that is
contingent upon the context in which liberalization is to occur.228
Some critics, such as liberal economists, encourage a multilateral
approach rather than a regional approach to trade liberalization.
229
219 Id. at 1.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 2.
222 See generally PANAGARIYA, supra note 21, at 47-111 (discussing preferential
trade areas and multilateralism).
223 See Paul Bowles, APEC: Progress Based on the Wrong Model?, 6 CAN. Bus.
ECON. 48 (1997) (discussing different definitions for regional blocs).
224 Id. at 52.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 52.
228 See PANAGARIYA, supra note 21, at 13. One school of thought is that there is
minimal trade diversion risk when union members are "Natural Trading Partners," that
is, they already trade with each other and are geographically proximate. However,
economists often criticize this view. Id.
229 See Bowles, supra note 223.
2005)
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
For such critics, regionalism is a second best choice after
multilateralism.23 °
Supporters of multilateral trade and regionalism that
complements multilateral trade are concerned with the plight of
developing economies excluded from the larger free trade
arrangements, either by choice or geography. 23 ' However, as a
developing country, China presents an anomaly, because it
proposes the world's largest FTA, comprising solely developing
Asian economies. A related question involves the role of
economics and/or politics as motivation for Chinese policy. In
terms of the feasibility of Asian regionalism, most critiques focus
on the viability of market-led cooperative regionalism, as seen in
thematic discourses addressing FTAs and RTAs.232 However, the
2004 ASEAN-China Accord may present a non-market
cooperative form of regionalism, constituting a model motivated
by political considerations that could pose an economic and
security threat to the Asia-Pacific region.
The world has witnessed a growth in both FFAs motivated
solely by political considerations and FTAs motivated by a
combination of economic and political considerations. If
motivations for FFAs are grounded in political considerations,
then the WTO may lose its appeal as a feasible alternative.233 For
example, political motivations were behind the negotiations of the
U.S.-Israel, U.S.-Jordan, and U.S.-Morocco FTAs. In addition,
the Mercosur Agreement (South American Common Market,
Mercado Comtn del Cono Sur or Southern Cone Common
Market) linking Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay was an
agreement motivated by political considerations.234  FTAs
230 Id.
231 Vision 2005, supra note 216.
232 See Warwick J. McKibbin & Wing Thye Woo, The Consequences of China's
WTO Accession on Its Neighbours (Oct. 18, 2002) (CEDS paper, on file with the
University of Michigan), http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu/CEDSpapers/WooWing
Thye.pdf.
233 Id. at 6-11.
234 See Pigina Oficial del MERCOSUR (Official Page of the Mercosur Secretariat),
http://www.mercosur.org.uy/; see also The EU's Relation with Mercosur-Overview,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/mercosur/intro/ ("The Mercosur was
created by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in March 1991 with the signing of
the Treaty of Asuncion. It originally was set up with the ambitious goal of creating a
common market/customs union between the participating countries. . . .A transition
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motivated entirely or in part by political considerations can have a
negative national and global effect in terms of economics.235 Such
FTAs may result in trade diversion, which is welfare reducing.236
Generally, FTAs grounded in exclusionary motivations present the
danger of being neither welfare enhancing nor complementary to
the WTO multilateral process, as participants will have little
interest in seeing progress at the multilateral level.237  However,
exclusionary FTAs primarily motivated by political
considerations, as opposed to economic considerations, have
greater potential to threaten multilateral trade. The proposed
ASEAN-China FTA, comprising developing economies, is
motivated solely by political considerations and thus poses a threat
to multilateral trade.
The question of whether an exclusionary FTA threatens
multilateralism is an issue of trade creation and welfare
enhancement rather than trade diversion and welfare reduction. In
terms of liberalization, diversion is the welfare change caused by
consumers and producers substituting higher cost imports from an
exporting economy for lower cost imports from third-world
economies.238  High-cost domestic production in one economy
replaced by lower-cost production in another economy creates
welfare improvement known as trade creation. 23 9 Therefore, trade
creation allows aligned countries to better exploit their
comparative advantage.24 ° In terms of more liberalized trade,
phase was set to begin in 1995 and to last until 2006 with a view to constituting the
common market.").
235 McKibban & Woo, supra note 232, at 6-11.
236 See Shujiro Urata, Towards an East Asia Free Trade Area, OECD Development
Centre, Policy Insights #1, 3 (Mar. 2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/55/
31098183.pdf.
237 McKibban & Woo, supra note 232, at 6-11.
238 See generally Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (1950) (introducing the concepts of trade creation
and trade diversion).
239 See Szepesi, supra note 174, at 8.
240 Id.; see also Richard N. Block, Karen Roberts & Russell Ormiston, Economic
Perspectives on International Labor Standards, 11 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 417, 419
(2002).
Traditionally, economists have referenced the "factor cost model" when
discussing international trade. Specifically, the theory suggests that countries
should specialize in the production of goods in which they can produce at least
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economies are able to further specialize their production, which
allows them to provide the products to the markets of aligned
economies at lower prices.241 Trade creation, in terms of FTAs,
improves resource allocation and welfare. 42 Whether or not trade
creation outweighs trade diversion determines whether aligned
economies will result in an overall net static welfare gain in an
economy.
243
One problem with FIAs is that they do not necessarily
generate gains from trade. An FTA employing a partial, if not
discriminatory, reduction in trade barriers, although shifting
sources of supply, ultimately still discriminates between
sources. 21 While gains can occur when production in an aligned
economy displaces higher cost domestic production, the reverse
effect, trade diversion, results when an aligned economy displaces
lower cost imports from non-aligned economies.245 In terms of
imports, FTAs between aligned developing economies tend to
generate trade diversion rather than trade creation.246  Assuming
homogenous goods, trade diversion will ensue when aligned
developing economies are burdened with domestic consumer
prices that are fixed at world prices and import trade tariffs.2 47
While the absence of an import tariff in aligned economies will
increase production, aligned economies will substitute cheaper
imports from non-aligned economies with more expensive aligned
economy imports. 248  The result is welfare-reducing trade
cost.... Theorists take into account a country's productive factor endowments,
including land, capital, labor and climate. In applying the factor cost model,
economists compare the costs of production of each product both within and
between countries. When a jurisdiction has the capability to produce a
particular product at least cost compared to other jurisdictions, it is said to have
an "absolute advantage." Meanwhile, that country is said to have a
"comparative advantage" in a certain product if it can produce that output
cheaper relative to other products within its boundaries. Id.
241 See Szepesi, supra note 174, at 8.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Regional Integration Agreement, supra note 5, at 40.
246 Id. at 90.
247 Id. at 42.
248 Id. at 42 (citing Maurice Schiff, Small Is Beautiful: Preferential Trade
Agreements and the Impact of Country Size, Market Share, and Smuggling, 12 J. ECON.
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diversion.249
FTAs comprising aligned developing economies present other
problems. In particular, there is the problem of income
convergence versus divergence. 250 Generally, such FTAs show a
proclivity towards divergence of their real incomes.251 In contrast,
aligned developed economies tend to cause real income levels to
converge. 2  This effect is mostly attributable to the phenomenon
that economies with comparative advantages closer to the world
average, rather than extreme comparative advantages, experience
better performance in FTAs.253 In FTAs, those economies that
manifest extreme comparative advantages, rather than those closer
to the world average, create the risk of switches in import
suppliers. 4  Wedging intermediate economies between an
economy with extreme comparative advantage and economies
closer to the world average tends to distort the extreme economy's
trade, that is, switches in supply economies. 5  In such an
instance, trade with the world as well as with an economy with an
extreme comparative advantage presents less close substitutes,
therefore enhancing the probability of trade diversion.256
Notwithstanding comparative advantages, the forces of
agglomeration and the flow of information equally tend to cause
income divergence in FTAs of developing economies.
The force of agglomeration bears mention because of the
disparity in economic development between China's coastal
regions and western provinces 8.25  The development of economic
INTEGRATION 359 (1997)).
249 Regional Integration Agreement, supra note 5, at 40.
250 Id. at 51-61.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Regional Integration Agreement, supra note 5, at 55.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 56-58.
257 Id.
258 See HUIJIONG, supra note 129; see also Accession to WTO Delivers $40 Billion a
Year to China's Economy But Gains Unevenly Shared: World Bank Study, World Bank:
News and Events, Feb. 21, 2005, http://www.worldbank.org.en/English/content/747
j63205722.shtml [hereinafter World Bank Study].
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centers calls into play a phenomenon known as the "cumulative
causation mechanism," which leads to clustering, or
agglomeration, of economic activity.:"9 Spatial clustering of
economic activities, such as electronics in Silicon Valley, cinema
in Hollywood, and auto manufacturing in Detroit, is common in
many cities.26°
In terms of manufacturing industries, clustering or
agglomeration is a by-product of the interaction between
"centripetal" forces that encourage firms to locate in close
proximity, and "centrifugal forces," such as "congestion,
pollution, or other negative externalities that might be associated
with concentrations of economic activity" that will encourage
firms to spread out.26' Generally, firms want to locate near
customers, and likewise, customers want to be closer to their
suppliers.262 However, "pulling in the opposite direction are
'centrifugal forces,' encouraging the dispersion of activity. "263
Market liberalization and other reforms associated with China's accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) are delivering gains worth more than $40
billion a year to China's economy, and adding about $75 billion a year to real
incomes worldwide, says a World Bank study. But the same report
recommends that China make policy adjustments to balance the uneven
distribution of benefits of these gains between the country's rural and urban
regions. World Bank Study, supra.
259 Anthony J. Venables, Regional Integration Agreements: A Force for
Convergence or Divergence? 15 (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 2260,
1999) ("Developing countires may be better served by 'north-south' than by 'south-
south' free trade agreements. Free trade agreements between low income countries tend
to lead to divergence in member country incomes, while agreements between high-
income countries tend to lead to convergence.").
260 Id.
261 Id. at 15-16.
The centripetal forces are usually classified in three groups. The first force is
knowledge spillovers, or other beneficial technological externalities that make it
attractive for firms to locate close to each other-in Marshall's phrase, "The
mysteries of the trade become no mysteries, but are, as it were, in the air." The
second group is various labor market pooling effects, which encourage firms to
locate where they can benefit from readily available labor skills-perhaps by
attracting skilled labor away from existing firms. The third centripetal force
arises from "linkages" between buyers and sellers. Id. at 15-16 (citing Alfred
Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1920)).
262 Venables, supra note 259, at 16.
263 Id. For example, industries in the United States are much more spatially
concentrated than in Europe (even controlling for the distribution of population and
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Uneven regional development and high spatial concentrations in
manufacturing are problematic for China;264  examples are
manufacturing centers in the Pearl Delta (Zhusan Jiao) in
Guangdong Province, and the Long River Delta (Changsan Jiao)
on the outskirts of Shanghai. 65
In terms of FrAs and problems of income convergence versus
divergence, the issue is one of balancing the centripetal and
manufacturing as a whole), suggesting that regional integration in Europe could cause
agglomeration at the sectoral level (for example, Germany gets engineering, the UK
financial services, and so on). The possibility that this might happen is generating some
concern in Europe, although evidence for it is so far rather weak. Regional Integration
Agreement, supra note 5, at 58 (citing H. G. Midelfart-Knarvik, S. Redding Overman &
Anthony J. Venables, The Location of Industry in Europe, Center for Economic Policy
Research, London (1999)).
264 Franqois Gipouloux, Integration or Disintegration? The Spatial Effects of
Foreign Direct Investment in China, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, May-June 1998, at 6,
http://www.cefc.com.hk/uk/pc/articles/art-ligne.php?num-art-ligne=1702. "[T]he coastal
provinces, with the exception of Liaoning, stand out from the rest of the country, with a
level of investment in industry from foreign-funded companies surpassing 15% (10% in
Jilian Province) . . . . Central and western China remain below this level. . . . The
massive re-locations that took place all through the 1990s, first in ASEAN countries and
then in the Chinese coastal areas, resulted in a manufacturing crescent, the vocation of
which was to reach out to the world and conquer distant markets." ld; see also Huang
Ping, China's Rural Migrants Under Uneven Development, 102-117, Soc. SCI. IN CHINA
(Zhongguo shehui kexue), Winter 2003 (discussing the problem of a dual system of a
rural-urban arrangement) ("In contrast to the dazzling race among metropolises to jiegui
('being geared to international conventions'), rural communities have deteriorated both
in scale and content."); see also Masahisa Fujita, J. Vernon Henderson, Yoshitsugu
Kanemoto & Tomoya Mori, Spatial Distribution of Economic Activities in Japan and
China, June 9, 2003, at 49-82, http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/henderson/Japan-
China-ReferencesPaper2.pdf (discussing spatial discrimination and the coast versus the
hinderlands) ("China has subsidized FDI (through tax breaks) in prefecture level cities
and encouraged FDI and trade development in certain coastal cities, as part of a general
program emphasizing coastal development, over hinterland development. The question is
whether the FDI policy is efficient."); see also The Spatial Distribution of Economic
Activities in Japan and China, Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics (J.V.
Henderson & J-F Thisse eds., 2004).
265 Gipouloux, supra note 264.
All in all, FDI in China has a three-fold effect on regional economic investment.
... [The third effect is that it] encourages integration of the coastal zones into a
network of international subcontracting led by the "Four Dragons", Japan and,
to a certain extent, American and European companies. These zones are clearly
oriented towards exports: what is happening in the Pearl River Delta, the
Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou triangle and, to a lesser extent, the Gulf of Bohai
is the constitution of a manufacturing crescent aiming to conquer distant
markets in Europe or the United States. Id.
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centrifugal forces at work.26 6  One problem is that an FIA
membership may amplify or cause the clustering of economic
activity, resulting in widening income differentials between
aligned economies. The probability that this will occur is
enhanced by the fact that in China, manufacturing as a whole is
generally clustered in a few locations, thus, "deindustrializing the
less favored regions. 267 Such patterns of clustering are likely to
lead to divergence of the income levels of members of an FTA.2 68
The same result holds true for a country, such as China,
whose basic industrial infrastructure-transport, transport,
telecommunications, access to financial markets, and other
business services-is thinly developed and most importantly,
unevenly spread.269 In addition, clustering "will be more likely to
occur with preferential trade liberalization-an FTA-than with
general import liberalization. 2 10 Consequently, "[t]his leads to the
strong result that FTAs between low income countries will tend to
cause divergence of their income levels, whereas FTAs between
high income levels will lead to convergence."271
Notwithstanding comparative advantage and agglomeration,
the force of knowledge flows can also cause the performance of
266 Venables, supra note 259, at 15.
267 Id. at 18.
268 Id. at 18-19. In south-south FTAs clustering patterns are likely to be reinforcing.
For example, as Nairobi, Abidjan and Dakar have attracted manufacturing, so they have
started to develop business networks and the linkages that tend to lock manufacturing in
to the location. The process might be further accelerated by the propensity of foreign
direct investment to cluster in relatively few locations. Agglomeration then accentuates
the comparative advantage forces for divergence. Id. at 18.
269 Id. at 18. Income divergence is also more likely to occur- if manufacturing as a
whole is a small share of the economy, "because fitting the whole of manufacturing in
one (or a few) locations is then less likely to press up against factor supply constraints
and lead to rising prices of immobile factors (such as land)." Id.; see also Stephen
Roach, The Challenge of China and India, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004,
http://win.mofcom.gov.cn. However, in China, the manufacturing sector constitutes a 53
percent share of the economy. Id.
270 Venables, supra note 259, at 18 ("This is because an FTA is inherently more
inward looking, strengthening linkages between firms in the FTA, so increasing one of
the centripetal forces.").
271 Id. at 20 ("The analysis suggests that developing countries are likely to gain
more from FTAs with high income countries, where there are better prospects for
convergence with the other-high income-members.").
[Vol. 31
WTO AND LEGALIZED TRADE DISTORTION
members of developing country FTAs to diverge. 272  However,
FTAs can promote knowledge flows between aligned economies,
such as transfers of technology, when comprising developed
economies with high incomes.273 There are clear implications that
increasing trade with high-income countries by forming a North-
South FFA, rather than South-South FTA, "may lead to beneficial
transfers of technology, and consequent convergence of
incomes. 274 Comparatively, aligned developing economies do not
offer such good prospects, especially when they are relatively
closed to external trade and are trade diverting. 5
Conversely, assuming net trade creation rather than diversion,
CUs or FTAs, such as NAFTA, should enjoy greater economic
efficiency and benefits stemming from increased trade and
investment. 6  The United States Trade Representative has even
advocated FTAs as triggering "competitive liberalization" and as
an alternate route to free trade with economies competing to open
markets to each other. 277 A fear of exclusion serves as an impetus
for nonmembers to either join the group or accept broader
agreements. 8 However, political motivation in part or in entirety
engenders a tacit assumption of trade diversion. FTAs motivated
solely by politics are neither welfare enhancing, nor
complementary to the WTO and multilateralism. 279 Thus, models
of regionalism motivated by political considerations threaten
multilateral trade and, most importantly, produce trade distortion
272 Regional Integration Agreement, supra note 5, at 59-61 ("Increasing trade with
high-income countries by forming a North-South RIA may lead to beneficial transfers of
technology, and consequent convergence of incomes.").
273 Id. at 59-60.
274 Id.
275 Id. at61.
276 See generally James E. Meade, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNION (1955); see also
generally Viner, supra note 238; Kym Anderson, The Challenge of Reducing Subsidies
and Trade Barriers 4 (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 3415,2004).
277 Soamiely Andriamananjara, On the Relationship Between Preferential Trade
Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System, Remarks prepared for the PECC Trade
Forum Meetings at the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 3
(Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.pecc.org/publications/papers/trade-papers/lSII/6-andria
mananjara.PDF.
278 Id.
279 Stoler, supra note 210, at 4.
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and are welfare reducing.28°
A problem of FTAs, such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and the
European experiment that was clearly motivated by political
considerations, a8' is that they "inevitably politicize trade more than
multilateral trade agreements do., 282 However, what distinguishes
Chinese regionalism from other FTAs is a proposed ASEAN-
China FTA comprising only developing economies. China is a
developing country, as opposed to a least-developed country, thus
avoiding any arguable exceptions to the general theory
prognosticating a welfare reducing effect.283  Notwithstanding an
exception to the general theory of the welfare effect of trade
distortion,284 the advent of a politically motivated ASEAN-China
FTA, as the world's largest FTA, will likely produce trade
distortion in the global economy-assuming arguendo the world's
largest FTA could produce immeasurable and exponentially
growing welfare reducing effects.
FTAs between developing economies and the poorest
economies, such as the proposed ASEAN-China FTA, present a
host of potential problems. 285  Typical trade areas comprising
subsets of nations are not necessarily welfare enhancing for all
participating nations. 286  Notwithstanding causes and effects of
280 See Edward J. Lincoln, Taking APEC Seriously 6 (Brookings Institute, Policy
Brief No. 92, Dec. 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb92.htm.
281 See J. F. Francois & M. Rombout, Preferential Trade Arrangements, Induced
Investment, and National Income in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Ramsey Model 2 (Tinbergen
Institute, Discussion Paper TI 2000-061/2, June 2000), http://www.tinbergen.nl/
discussionpapers/00061 .pdf.
282 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 110 (2002).
283 See id. (discussing the theory that free trade might not be best policy for LDCs
that are facing what economists refer to as a market distortion); see also WTO,
Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Least Developed Countries,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org7-e.htm ("The WTO recognizes
as least-developed countries (LDCs) those countries which have been designated as such
by the United Nations. There are currently [fifty] least-developed countries on the UN
list, [thirty-two] of which to date have become WTO members.").
284 Anderson, supra note 276, at 2.
285 PANAGARIYA, supra note 21, at 126 ("[B]oth economics and politics are against a
discriminatory bloc in East Asia. Historically, East Asia has benefited greatly from an
open world trading system. The region's future interests will continue to be served by a
strategy, which ensure an open world trading system.").
286 Andriamananjara, supra note 277.
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trade distortion, such as import issue and real distortion, the harm
from discrimination in trade affects exports to an FTA market as
well as the terms of trade, which include decreased export prices
required to maintain competitiveness in a preferential market.287
An FTA, particularly its discriminatory nature, has the potential to
adversely affect the poorest economies.288  Moreover, trade
distortion stemming mostly from non-participants in the global
economy will adversely affect aligned developing countries,
especially the poorest economies in an FTA, as well as the global
economy.289
A politically motivated FTA may also pose a threat to regional
security for China. The region known as the Asia-Pacific does not
include South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and
Sri Lanka), or Southwest Asia (the Arab Peninsula, Iraq, and
Iran). 290 Instead, the Asia-Pacific refers to the region comprising
East Asia and Southeast Asia, two major socio-geographical
subsets (along with Oceania, North America and South America),
all constituting the Pacific Basin.2 91 It is a region that is larger
than Europe.292 However, without undertaking a lengthy analysis
of the security threat to such a large region, ample examples are
available in the sub regions of the Pacific Basin.293
Taiwan presents one such case. The pending crisis over cross-
strait relations between Beijing and Taipei is a prime example.
Although Taiwan is an Asian government, a growing proliferation
of China-led FTAs may threaten its economic liberalization.
Taiwan may well be dependent on Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) to support its economic liberalization.294 The
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 8.
290 See Tan Tai Yong, The Post-War History of East and Southeast Asia, ASIA-
EUROPE ENVIRONMENT FORUM, http://www.asef.org/asef-uni/3_infohub/infohub-m-
library.html.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Lai I-Chung, Taiwan Needs an APEC Strategy (Perry Svennson trans.) TAIPEI
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/1 I/
15/2003211174; see also Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Member Economies,
http://www.apec.org/apec/membereconomies.html.
294 See Lai, supra note 293.
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distinctive Chinese model of globalization (quanqiuhua) may pose
a political threat to its economic liberalization.295 Additionally the
proliferation of FTAs in the Asian region seems to be excluding
Taiwan. 296 While the Beijing-Taipei debate continues, Asian and
non-Asian nations are economically and politically aligning
themselves with China.297 This exclusion runs contrary to the
spirit of open regionalism that is exemplified by APEC, a model of
regionalism that seeks to complement, and not threaten, global
trade and the WTO.298 In terms of APEC, open regionalism is
generally defined as a concerted and unilateral trade liberalization
that is along the lines of the MFN status. 299  Taiwan faces the
threat of Beijing building an Asian strategic order centered on
China, because Beijing remains highly sensitive about the de jure
and de facto recognition of Taiwan's legitimacy through
participation in regional and international dialogues. 00  For
example, there are the Boao Forum for Asia and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, both of which were established by
China, and exclude Taiwan." 1 In addition, China is employing the
six-nation talks addressing the North Korean nuclear issue for
purpose of redefining strategic positions of the United States,
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 See id.
298 Id.
299 See id.
300 JING-DONG YUAN, ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY: CHINA'S CONDITIONAL
MULTILATERALISM AND GREAT POWER ENTENTE 16 (2000), http://www.carlisle
.army. nil/ssi/pubs/2000/asiapac/asiapac.pdf.
301 Lai, supra note 293; see also Backgrounder. Chronology of Boao Forum for
Asia, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, June 25, 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200404/23/
eng20040423_141356.shtml ("Feb. 27, 2001: The BFA was officially established, with
the Declaration on the BFA adopted by delegates from 26 founding member countries.
Chinese President Jiang Zemin addressed and presented a poem to the inauguration
ceremony of the BFA."); China.org.cn, China and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, May 13, 2003, http://www.chinataiwan.org/web/webportal/W5042136/
A5046305.html ("On June 15, 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was
established in Shanghai by the heads of state of the six countries of China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzatan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan on the basis of the original
"Shanghai Five," signifying the birth of a new regional cooperation organization aiming
to seek security through mutual trust and to seek cooperation through mutual benefit.").
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Japan, and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula.30 2 No doubt,
most realize that China has the capability of reining in Kim Jong
II, if it so elects." 3 It has even been suggested that China derives a
"psychological satisfaction from watching Pyongyang's nuclear
roguery stymie Japan and the United States.""
In addition, the ASEAN nations, which are representative of
nations in this sub-region, perceived security threats posed by
China.30 5  China's domination of the Asian region through
economic, political, and especially military coercion is
problematic.30 6 China's rising economic power in Asia has
evolved into a rising military power, or at least increased fears of a
Chinese military presence in the Asian region.30 7 According to
Singapore Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean, China and India have
"aspirations to be regional, if not global, powers."30 8 As China
gains economic power, China continues to reshape the geopolitical
contours of the Asian region.30 9 A primary concern for many is
that the United States and China may become locked in an
adversarial relationship concerning regional peace and security,
because many deem China ambitious enough to dominate the
Asian region.3"0
302 Lai, supra note 293; see also Upcoming Six-nation Talks in Jeopardy, ASIA
NEWS, Sept. 16, 2004, http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=1489. Although talks
did eventually resume, China's initial response was perceived as follows, "Until concrete
evidence is produced China-the main go-between in the six-nation talks-has declined
making any comment." Upcoming Six-Nation Talks in Jeopardy, supra.
303 Victor Davis Hanson, The Global Shift, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Jun. 10, 2005,
http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson06l005.html.
304 Id.
305 See, e.g., Strange bedfellows at the UN: Growing Asian worries over PRC
power, CHINA REFORM MONITOR No. 597, Aug. 12, 2005, http://www.afpc
.org/crm/crm597.shtml.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id. at para. 4.
309 See Potential Chinese dominance of North Korea: New anti-secession law
pressures Taiwan, CHINA REFORM MONITOR No. 572, Dec. 21, 2004, http://www.afpc
.org/crm/crm572.shtml (noting that China is ambitious to dominate Asia and discusses
examples involving North Korea and Taiwan).
310 See id.; see also White Paper Maps Military's Future, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
Dec. 28, 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200412/28/eng20041228_168913.html
("But the old security problems in the region have not been fundamentally removed
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In terms of exclusionary FTAs, which are most problematic for
non-Asian economies with the advent of a growing interest in
regionalism and a perceived weak APEC, Asian nations are
actively pursuing regional dialogues to the exclusion of non-Asian
economies.31' In light of a perceived weak and ineffective APEC,
Asian nations started turning to ASEAN, or ASEAN Plus Three,
and FTAs between Asian nations,31 such as the 2004 ASEAN-
China Accord. The growth of Asian FTAs, especially the new
potential of Asian regionalism proposed by ASEAN at the Tenth
ASEAN summit, may pose a threat to multilateral trade and the
WTO. The ASEAN summit struck an accord between China and
ASEAN that could result in the largest FTA in the world.
III. China-Led Regionalism
The Western world should not be dismayed by China's
geopolitical posturing through the vehicle of Chinese regionalism
(quyu zhuyi). The concept of China's "new regionalism" (xin
quyu zhuyi) was in part borrowed from Western models of FTAs,
such as the European Union and NAFTA.313 The European Union
is considered by many to be a model for regionalism, especially in
its formal institutionalization and progression from FTA to
economic union. 314  However, China shuns many of the positive
aspects of the more orthodox models of regional integration
because political considerations and geopolitical posturing in the
Asian region primarily motivate Chinese regionalism.
Some analysts say China is developing a variant to the
while new insecure elements are emerging. The United States is realigning and beefing
up its military presence in the region and strengthening military alliances.").
311 See Lincoln, supra note 280.
312 Id.
313 See Tianshu Liu, Implication of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effect on
Trade between RTAs and China and Australia, Proceedings of the 16th Annual
Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Studies, Brisbane, Australia, Jul.
19-20, 2004, at 2, http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/acesa2004/pro/Liu.pdf.
314 See generally Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (1961)
(discussing a model of integration that progresses from agreement of states (FTA) to
customs union, then to economic union); see also Regionalism and World Order
(Andrew Gamble & Anthony Payne eds., 1966) (comparing other models of regionalism
with the EU model).
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European Union model, or Western model, of regionalism." 5
China may eventually demonstrate to a multilateral-inclined, free
trade world the difference between traditional and West-centric
trade methodologies and the praxis of FTAs with Chinese
characteristics. In its bid to be a world player, China extended the
country's growing economic powers to form an entire region of
international political power. Many sources, especially economic
assessments of China's economic performance, seem to ignore the
geopolitical forces accompanying China's intent to broaden Asian
regionalism, while also making it more exclusive, perhaps
characterized as an Asia-only club.316 Creating such a distinctive
club entails consequences that are political and result in China
situating itself as the political leader in the Asia region. Prime
examples of such problems include the previously mentioned
pending crisis over cross-strait relations with Taiwan and the six-
315 See, e.g., Asia Strategic Forum's Mt. Kumgang Conference "Whither the Six
Party Talks on North Korea: A Prelude to the Asian Century or a Footnote to the War on
Terrorism?," Institute for International Policy, University of Washington, Mt. Kumgang,
North Korea, June 10-12, 2005, http://www.iip.washington.edu/pdf/Mt-Kumgang-
Proceedings-090905.pdf [hereinafter Mt. Kumgang Conference] ("In fact, the growth of
anti-Americanism spurred in part Washington's East Asia policies has motivated many
East Asian countries toward a narrower form of regionalism that the majority believed to
be detrimental to fuller integration as well as to U.S. strategic interests."); see also
Baldwin, supra note 7 ("The Domino theory predicts that either will produce an East
Asia wide free trade area for manufacturers, but with different endpoints.").
316 See Mt. Kumgang Conference, supra note 315 ("However, the upcoming
formalization of ASEAN + Three into the East Asian Community sparked renewed fears
among several conference analysts of an exclusive grouping that will be detrimental to
regional integration (full global integration) and as well as U.S. strategic interests."); see
also Eric Teo Chu Cheow, China as the Center of Asian Economic Integration, ASS'N
FOR ASIAN RES., Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2241.html ("But the
East Asian model for economic and monetary cooperation would be less of an
institutional model (as in Europe) than a functional one. Whatever its future modality,
Asian integration appears to be centered on a China-inspired East Asian growth."); see
also M. Ulric Killion, Three Represents and China's Constitution: Presaging Cultural
Relativisitic Asian Regionalism, 13 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 23 (2004).
In terms of regionalism, it is China, more so than any other developing country
or economy, that demonstrates the potency of nationalism and embodies
possible alternatives to Western conceptions of democracy and capitalism.
China is a reminder that history is not close to an end and in that sense it issues
a cultural, political, and if one will, ideological challenge to those who entertain
especially expansive and dialectic visions of world order. Killion, supra, at
105.
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nation talks addressing the North Korean nuclear issue.317
While Western economists and politicians debated the merits
and likelihood of success and failure in East Asian regionalism, in
terms of ASEAN3" 8 and APEC's Bogor goals," 9 China continued
to both engage ASEAN and pursue a regional FTA with ASEAN.
To the dismay of the Western world, Asian regionalism now
seems a likely probability. However, critics say there is no Asian
regionalism based strictly on "fundamental identity or ideology ...
[nor is the region] ready for either deep economic integration or
political convergence. ASEAN has diluted, comprising six
relatively more developed, rich states and four poorer transition
economies, forged by politics and security first, scale economies
second." 320 Thus, China is demonstrating to a doubting Western
world, the difference between west-centric regional trade
taxonomies and the praxis of open regionalism with Chinese
characteristics. Moreover, because of an increasing connectedness
between China and ASEAN, the fate of sub-regional groupings,
such as APEC, became largely intertwined with a Chinese praxis
of FTAs with Chinese characteristics.
The ASEAN summit held in Vientiane, Laos in November
2004 forged new trails in terms of Asian regionalism and
community building.321 This meeting most importantly resulted in
the landmark 2004 ASEAN-China accord.3 22 The accord laid the
groundwork for the introduction of a possible new rival for
APEC.323 The future of Asian regionalism, which garnered some
support at the Tenth ASEAN summit, may well be what is being
317 REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 5, 15, 101-104.
318 See REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE, ASIA AND THE AMERICAS
II (William D. Coleman et. al. eds., 1998); see also REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM,
AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL TRADE 10-13 (Donald Barry et. al. eds., 1999).
319 See Sharma, supra note 43, at 37-38 and accompanying text; see also Bogor
Declaration, supra note 43.
320 Linda Low, Overview, Comparative Evaluation and Prognosis of Bilateral
Trade Agreements (BTAs) in Asia and the Pacific, Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.unescap.org/tid/mtg/low.pdf.
321 See 10th ASEAN Summit, supra note 26.
322 Id.
323 See Eric Teo Chu Cheow, Bigger Steps Towards Asian Integration, CHINA
DAILY, Dec. 21, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.con/cn/english/doc/2004-12/21/content-
401932.htm.
[Vol. 3 1
WTO AND LEGALIZED TRADE DISTORTION
called "JACIK," comprising Japan, ASEAN, China, India, and the
Republic of Korea.324 India may be the only limitation to forming
a "JACIK" FTA.3 25 India is aware that in order to join "JACIK" it
will have to obtain the tacit consent of Japan and China.326
Moreover, a China-India FTA is "under study. 3 27 As of August
2005, the China Council for Promotion of International Trade
(CCPIT) called for expediting a China-India FTA, which alone
would encompass two-fifths of the world's population.3 28  The
ASEAN-China accord created the prospect for a free trade
megazone.3 29 However, an ASEAN-China FTA, in conjunction
with a prospective "JACIK" FTA, turned the prospect of a free
trade megazone into a potential free trade super megazone.
China is determinedly pursuing a "JACIK" FrA.33 ° In January
2005, China commenced a feasibility study addressing an East
Asia Free Trade Area (Dong Meng Ziyou Maoyi Qu) that includes
China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the ten member ASEAN
nations .31  This trade area is expected to reflect the arrangement
recently effected with ASEAN.332 The background for this model
of a broader Asian regionalism dates back to 2003, when China
Premier Wen Jiabao initially made the proposal for an East Asia
Free Trade Area.333 One Chinese source described this process as
a gradual and long-term process, which will be established by joint
efforts from "relevant" countries. 334  A future "JACIK" FTA
would be an expansion of both the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord
and the theme of an Asia-only club, which excludes "non-
relevant" members, such as Australia, Canada, the United States,
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Bilaterals.org, China Calls for Expediting Free Trade Agreement,
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=2453.
328 Id.
329 See Cheow, supra note 323.
330 Bilaterals.org, supra note 327.
331 See Study Starts on Free Trade Zone for East Asia, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 24, 2005,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005 -01/24/content_411515.htm.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
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the European Union, and other Western nations and developed
economies.
The termination of the ATC, and the potential resulting global
economic crisis, enhanced the anticipated welfare-reducing effect
of the proposed ASEAN-China FTA.335 This presents an issue of
the need for a buffer, albeit seemingly contradictory to free trade,
sanctioning trade distortions such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in
the interests of the global economy. It is perhaps a matter of
choosing the lesser of two evils. The choices are prospective and
immeasurable trade distortions from an ASEAN-China FTA
versus more quantitative trade distortions implicitly allowed to
exist, if not legalized, under the WTO rules.
Ten years after the Uruguay Round multilateral trade
negotiations, many subsidies and trade distortions remain. In
terms of the implicitly legalized trade distortions, there is Article
XX(b) of the GATT, which permits an importing country to
introduce measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant
life and health.336 Furthermore, the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade governs the imposition of technical requirements
on products by an importing country. 37 These include trade taxes-
cum-subsidies, protection measures such as anti-dumping
regulatory standards and domestic production subsidies.3 38  In
addition, insufficient or excessive taxation or quantitative
regulations also lead to inefficiencies and can be trade
distorting.339  Most importantly, FTAs motivated by political
considerations, which are legal pursuant to WTO rules, and
proposed buffers such as NTBs to offset trade distortion, tend to
produce trade and investment diversion rather than creation.3 40
335 ATC, supra note 23.
336 See Willy Lin, Chairman, Hong Kong Shipper's Council, Speech at the Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council's 15th General Meeting: Implications of the End of the
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, (Sept. 1, 2003), http://www.tdctrade.com/
shippers/vol26_5/vo126_5_chairman_03.htm; see also Joel P. Trachtman, Decisions of
the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 793 (2001),
http://www.ejil.org/joumal/curdevs/srl3.html#TopOfPage (discussing Article XX(b)).
337 See Lin, supra note 336.
338 See Anderson, supra note 276, at 2.
339 Id.
340 McKibbin & Woo, supra note 232, at 6-11.
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Most problematic and discerning is that the ASEAN-China FTA,
taken in conjunction with termination of the ATC, could produce
immeasurable welfare-reducing effects and thus cause disastrous
economic and social consequences worldwide.
One might argue that the 2004 ASEAN-China accord may not
establish a trade region that is welfare reducing. In such an
instance, it would create a trade region with a net static welfare
gain; that is, trade and investment creation and not diversion.
However, most ASEAN economies have not yet fully made the
transition from food, agriculture, and forestry, to industrial
development and export-based growth.3 4 ' Although developing
rapidly, most ASEAN economies are still heavily dependent on
agriculture and other food-based industries.342 ASEAN is still a
relatively weak economic body. Notwithstanding the East Asian
financial crisis, "[in 1999-2000, the region showed some signs of
economic recovery but was interrupted by poor export
performance and low FDI inflows. The September 11 incident
further worsened conditions in the region, by causing economic
slowdowns in ASEAN's major trading and investment partners-
the US, Japan and the European Union. ' 3 43 In 2001, Intra-ASEAN
exports accounted for only twenty percent of ASEAN's total
exports, the same proportion as in 1970. 3" ASEAN nations are
still addressing a post-East Asian financial crisis of declining FDI.
Moreover, non-market-led cooperative regionalism, rather than
market-led cooperative regionalism, motivated an ASEAN-China
FTA.3 45  As a result, and reflecting orthodox trade theory, a
proposed ASEAN-China FTA should not manifest a net static
gain.
While China followed a trend in growing regionalism similar
341 Second ASEAN State of the Environment Report 2000, Chapter 4: Economic
Development, 2000 UNEP RRC.AP, 24-37 (2000), http://www.rrcap.unep.org/sub-
region/aseansoe/.
342 Id.
343 Teofilo C. Daquila, Asean's Economic Performance Reviewing the Past,
Looking to the future, 6(2) HARv. ASIA Q. 10 (2002), http://www.fas.harvard.edu
/~asiactr/haq/200203/daquila.pdf.
344 Walden Bello, Viewpoint: Is ASEAN Irrelevant?, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
Dec. 17, 2004, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=1060 (discussing
problems of ASEAN regionalism).
345 Lijun, supra note 7; Baldwin, supra note 7; Cheow, supra note 323.
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to the European Union model, it nonetheless produced a variant
model. China's model of regionalism is primarily motivated by
political considerations, rather than economic considerations. The
2004 ASEAN-China Accord proposes a regionalism best
described as non-orthodox and non-market-led cooperative
regionalism. Given that the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord proposes
the world's largest FTA, in conjunction with potential harm from
the termination of the ATC, one can reasonably prognosticate both
an enhanced trade distortion and welfare reducing effect.
Assuming the pending 2004 ASEAN-China Accord creates trade
diversion rather than trade creation, it is a threat to trade and
investment liberalization, the goals of the WTO, and multilateral
trade.
The problem of the trade creation-diversion dichotomy is that
even FTAs based on the European Union model manifest some
degree of trade diversion. However, such FTAs are motivated in
part by political considerations that do not appear to threaten
multilateral trade and count as examples the European Union and
NAFTA. The WTO rules governing FTAs (Article XXIV) are in
dire need of reform. In the interim, the ambiguities contained
within both Article XXIV and the WTO Memorandum of
Understanding on Article XXIV create implicitly legalized trade
distortions, which contribute to both a growth of regionalism and
an increase in threats to multilateral trade, such as the proposed
ASEAN-China FTA.
Generally, the WTO is perceived as a free trade institution.
However, in practical terms, it is more aptly described as an
institution manifesting rules that do not actually prescribe free
trade; instead, various substantive and procedural norms prescribe
a code of conduct that makes trade a multilateral issue.346 As a
result, the WTO is more of a rules-based system dedicated to
open, fair, and undistorted competition. 347 The latter is a more
accurate descriptor of the WTO because WTO rules permit tariffs
and other forms of protectionism or NTBs, such as anti-dumping.
Such competition makes more obvious the problems of an
346 Killion, supra note 105, at 53-56 (discussing free trade and multilateralism
versus unilateralism).
347 REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL TRADE, supra
note 318, at 33.
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ambiguous and contradictory Article XXIV and evolving
exceptions to Article XXIV become more obvious. Thus,
pursuant to goals of open, fair, and undistorted competition,
greater significance attaches to the issue of the threat of a
proliferation of trade distorting FTAs, such as the proposed 2004
ASEAN-China FTA.
In this respect, the proposed ASEAN-China FTA may be a
symptom of the problem of the WTO rules as opposed to the cause
or justification for a seemingly growing preference of regionalism
over multilateralism, particularly in the Asian region. Simply
amending Article XXIV and lending clarity to its supposed
proscriptions would stay the potential threat of regionalism. In
terms of the WTO, the earlier mentioned interwar concerns are no
longer relevant, justifying a departure from an intentional
vagueness manifest in Article XXIV and the WTO Memorandum
of Understanding on Article XXIV. The changing political
economy of a post-WTO world and growing regionalism equally
justify a departure from the inherent vagueness of Article XXIV.
However, this does not alleviate the potential threat of the
2004 ASEAN-China Accord. An OEDC study foretold that
China's growth is losing its dynamism.348  Assuming this
prediction is true, China should pursue more orthodox or even
Western models of development. A case in point is the 1997-1998
East Asian financial crisis.349 This crisis brought into question
whether too much had initially been expected from Asian
industrialization or whether the Asian development model, in
relying on foreign capital, lacked substance.35 ° Debates ensued
concerning reaction to the Asian financial crisis and to the
correctness of the IMF's prescription, especially what Asian
economies deemed rigorous conditionalities of the IMF and World
348 Developments in Selected Non-member Economies, supra note 141.
349 Quaker United Nations Office, Convergence or Surrender on Development? The
UN and Brentwood Institutions (QUNO Briefing Paper No. 2/00, Aug. 2000),
http://www.afsc.org/quno/Resources/BP200008.htm ("Much of the blame for the 1998
financial crisis and its consequences has been placed with national governments but the
IMF has also been faulted for initial misdiagnoses and for prescribing inappropriate
solutions that worsened the crisis and its effects.").
350 See Takeshi Isayama, Comm'r, Japan Patent Office, Keynote Speech: APEC
Region Intellectual Property Right Protections Beyond the Year 2000, 2 (Feb. 22, 1999),
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou-e/kovenroko_e/19990222.htm.
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Bank.35 1 There was also the problem of an influx of international
short-term capital. 352 During this period, the United States, Europe
and Japan were criticized for doing too little, too late.353 The East
Asian financial crisis left the Asia-Pacific region feeling the brunt
of uncertainty, especially about the future.354  The East Asian
financial crisis has been described as Asian economies forgetting
to steadfastly pursue an industrialization pattern reflective of
Asian reality.3 55  Asian economies depended on international
short-term capital via financial liberalization to combat capital
shortages.356  If Asian economies had developed their soft
infrastructures, such as human resources, along with hard
infrastructures, such as roads, factories, and transportation, then
pursued a more orthodox industrial development path of
cultivating industries, this problem would have never intensified to
the degree that it did.357
The assessments of the East Asian financial crisis have been
mixed. Some have argued that export orientation was the major
source of growth competitiveness.35 8  However, one source
challenged such findings through quantitative analysis of case
studies and concluded that imports do have a stronger effect on
productivity than exports.359 The ramification of the latter study
directly relates to the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord because of the
consequences of China's polity restricting imports or import-based
growth via Chinese regionalism. Such regionalism is prompted by
political considerations rather than economic considerations. As
previously mentioned, in terms of imports, FTAs between aligned
developing economies and the poorest economies, such as the
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Isayama, supra note 350.
356 Robert Z. Lawrence & David E. Weinstein, Trade and Growth: Import-Led or
Export-Led? Evidence from Japan and Korea, in RETHINKING THE EAST ASIA MIRACLE
379-407 (Joseph E. Stiglitz et. al. eds., 2001); see also HUIJUIONG, supra note 129, at 327-
338 (discussing earlier publications on East Asia's success).
357 Lawrence & Weinstein, supra note 356, at 379-407.
358 See id.
359 See id.
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proposed ASEAN-China FTA, have a proclivity to generate trade
diversion rather than trade creation.3 60 Notwithstanding proclivity
of trade diversion stemming from aligned developing economies
and termination of the ATC, a restriction on imports by the
world's largest proposed FTA will produce and enhance both trade
diversion and the resulting welfare-reducing effect. As a result,
the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord proposes a non-orthodox and
non-market-led cooperative regionalism, which will adversely
affect trade and investment liberalization, the goals of the WTO,
and the global economy.
Regionalism may constitute the movement of polities in terms
of politics, rather than economies in terms of globalization.3 6'
Assuming arguendo the latter is true, then regionalism is
compromised in its capacity as a supposed complement to a
multilateral trade approach. Indeed, the loophole for FTAs under
WTO Rule XXIV and the WTO Memorandum of Understanding
on Article XXIV needs to be closed by way of amendment.
Otherwise, global trade may witness a continuing growth of FTAs
and RTAs posing a threat to multilateral trade and allowed to
flourish under the sanctuary of WTO rules that tolerate implicitly
legalized trade distortion. Moreover, notwithstanding an
amendment of Article XXIV, implicitly legalized trade distortion
may evolve into explicitly legalized trade distortion, further
enhancing threats to multilateral trade. In terms of amending the
WTO rules, the critical issue is ascertaining the line between
models of regionalism that complement multilateral trade and
models of regionalism so "distortionary" in nature that the
international trading system should no longer tolerate them.
Conversely, it may be that nations have acted politically, in
pursuance of national and regional interests, as a dual approach to
development, seeking both to liberalize and define the terms of
their liberalization.3 62 However, to suggest China's leaders elected
to pursue a dual approach in regionalism to complement a
multilateral trade approach is a denial of China's solely political
motivations in deciding to use FTAs as a political policy tool by
directing the focus towards ASEAN becoming China's first FTA
360 McKibbin & Woo, supra note 232, at 6-11.
361 See Bowles, supra note 223.
362 Id.
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partner. A problem for multilateral trade may well be China's
ambition to politically dominate the Asian region. In terms of the
survival of China's polity, China's political unilateral nationalistic
concerns may override multilateral trade concerns. As a result, a
trend in Chinese regionalism motivated by political considerations
may increasingly manifest closed and unilateral models of
regionalism, such as the proposed ASEAN-China FTA.
This article admittedly seeks to prospectively address a
pending global trade crisis. The initial crisis is the trade diversion
and welfare-reducing effect that will be produced by the world's
largest FTA, the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord. The general theory
of the welfare effect of trade distortion prognosticates a threat to
multilateral trade, especially due to aligned developing economies
in an FIA and restrictions on import-based growth. In addition,
the threat to global trade from the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord is
enhanced by the possibility of a future "JACIK" FTA. Further
increasing the threat to multilateral trade is the timing of the
accord. The 2004 ASEAN-China Accord concluded in November
of 2004, just one month short of the termination of the ATC,
therefore further enhancing the threat to multilateral trade.
IV. Conclusion
Those entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding
multilateral trade and the goals and aspirations embodied in the
WTO should follow closely China's growing regionalism (quyu
zhuyi). An Asian Development Bank (ADB) study, conducted in
terms of the emergence of China, observed that China "presents as
many opportunities as threats to East Asian policy makers. 363
The study also noted that including China in ASEAN could induce
trade diversion across both the region and "with respect to
economies outside East Asia." 364  Primarily due to sheer size,
China "appears to be in a unique position to 'go it alone' on the
path to globalization, i.e. most of its own benefits from
multilateralism can be captured by unilateral liberalization. 365 An
363 See David Roland-Hoist, An Overview of PRC's Emergence and East Asian
Trade Patterns to 2020 4 (ADB Institute, Research Paper Series No. 44, Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.adbi.orglresearch-paper/2002/10/O1/90.prc.s.emergence/.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 4.
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exclusionary model of Chinese regionalism, such as the proposed
ASEAN-China FTA, motivated by political considerations,
constitutes unilateralism in trade and poses a threat to multilateral
trade.
The success of the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord would
represent a new model of regionalism in that it is an alignment of
developing economies and contradicts orthodox and conventional
wisdom of both import-based growth and Western models of
regionalism. Moreover, a successful ASEAN-China FTA, in
conjunction with a China-led "JACIK" FTA, both motivated by
political considerations, presents a serious threat to trade and
investment liberalization, multilateral trade, and the goals of the
WTO. Notwithstanding an amendment to WTO Article XXIV,
the multilateral world trading system may someday awake and
find itself the victim of the dynamics of China's sheer size and
unilateral regionalism.
64 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 31
